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28 JULY 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-048

### CONTENTS

28 JULY 1989

#### PARTY, STATE AFFAIRS

Party's Accomplishments Cited; New Deputies Support Urged [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 7 May 89]	1
Uzbek Draft Law on Languages Published for Public Discussion	5
Supreme Soviet Instructions [KOMSOMOLETZ UZBEKISTANA 20 Jun 89]	5
Text of Draft Law [KOMSOMOLETZ UZBEKISTANA 20 Jun 89]	6
Uzbek First Secretary Meets With Central Asian Muslim Leader [PRAVDA VOSTOKA 19 May 89]	10
Armenian CP Buro on Internal Procedural, Structural Changes [KOMMUNIST 21 May 89]	10

#### MEDIA, PROPAGANDA

Officials Seek Advances in Video Availability, VCR Production	12
More Video Theaters, VCR's Planned [A. Ladynin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 11 Jun 89]	12
Clarification of Permitted Standards Sought [V. Belonosov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 23 Jun 89]	14
Changes in Media, Religion, State Relationship Debated	15
'Pro-Religion' Media Bias Blasted [A. Bykovskiy; ZHURNALIST No 4, Apr 89]	15
New Attitudes Defended [L. Mitrokhin; ZHURNALIST No 4, Apr 89]	17

#### SOCIAL ISSUES

Georgian Procuracy Reviews Recent Illegal Land Appropriations [V. Razmadze; ZARYA VOSTOKA 20 Jun 89]	23
Specialist on Video Piracy, Pornography, Black Market [S. Pluzhnikov; MOLOD UKRAYINY 6 Apr 89]	25
Status of Soviet Jewish Culture Debated [V.I. Rabinovich; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 24 Jun 89]	27

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

Major Issues of Ethnic North Reviewed [V. Ledkov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Jun 89]	30
Leningrad Workers To Form United Front [LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 8 Jun 89]	32
Solovyev Welcomes GDR Navy Officers [LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 13 May 89]	33
Information Distribution in Need of Modernization [S. Kleshchuk; LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 24 May 89]	33
Buryat Writers Meet at Congress [M. Lomunova; LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA 12 May 89]	35
New Nature Reservation Opens [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 9 Jun 89]	37
Iterup Volcano Becomes Active [S. Saktaganov; PRAVDA 12 May 89]	37
Plans for Ethnic Centers in Moscow [PRAVDA 16 May 89]	37
BSSR SupSov Approves Commission To Guarantee Rights of Repression Victims [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA 16 Apr 89]	37
Historian Supports Giving Belorussian State Status [O. Trusov; KOMMUNIST BELORUSIYA No 5, May 89]	38
BSSR Medical Official on Health Issues Stemming From Chernobyl [A. Kryzhanovskiy; SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA 27 Apr 89]	39
Meeting Commemorating Chernobyl Tragedy Held in Minsk [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA 28 Apr 89]	41
BSSR First Secretary Meets With Nuclear Specialist [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA 29 Apr 89]	41
Academic Discusses Prospects for Ukrainian National Culture [P. Tolochko; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA 8 Apr 89]	42
Writer B. Oleynik Traces History of Repression of Ukrainian Language, Culture [B. Oleynik; PRAVDA UKRAYINY 14 May 89]	43
WHO Officials Discuss Chernobyl Illness [PRAVDA UKRAYINY 25 Apr 89]	54
Memorial to Chernobyl Worker Unveiled [PRAVDA UKRAYINY 27 Apr 89]	54
Chernobyl Memorial Meeting Held in Kiev [PRAVDA UKRAYINY 28 Apr 89]	54

Joint Harvard-Ukrainian Historical Commission Publication Proposed [RABOCHAYA GAZETA 20 Apr 89] .....	56
Economist Advocates UkSSR Model for USSR Union of Cooperatives [V.F. Shulzhenko; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA 25 Feb 89] .....	57
Belorussian Authorities Reaffirm Opposition to New Polluting Plants [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 24 May 89] .....	59
Solovyev, Reymers on Environmental Policies, Administrative Concerns [L. Solovyev; NEDELYA No 21, 22-28 May 89] .....	60
VASKhNIL Academician Discusses Ecological Problems in Agriculture [N.Z. Milashchenko; ZEMLEDELIYE No 5, May 89] .....	63
Metro Station Contaminated by Tashkent Aircraft Plant Waste .....	67
Metro Workers Demand Safety [PRAVDA VOSTOKA 14 Apr 89] .....	67
Officials Promise Corrective Measures [PRAVDA VOSTOKA 26 May 89] .....	68
Goskompriroda Chief Morgun on Uzbek Environmental Concerns [F. T. Morgun; PRAVDA VOSTOKA 20 May 89] .....	69

**Party's Accomplishments Cited; New Deputies Support Urged**

18300630 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 7 May 89 p 1

[KazTAG report: "Toward the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Kazakhstan: Following the Compass of Perestroika"]

[Text] The slogan of October "All Power to the Soviet" has now become the slogan of perestroika. Only for this reason can it with full justification be called revolutionary: as is known, at all times with major social changes the question of power has been crucial. On 25 May, all power will be transferred to the hands of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. It is a truly historical event as the nation is moving toward real rule by the people.

Good ground for this has been prepared by perestroika and perestroika, in turn, has been fostered by the party. Not everything is going presently as we planned, as we might wish, but on the fundamental, major questions we have reached the planned staging areas. Each person at present can easily follow the rational sequence and inner cohesiveness of the profound processes in society over the 4 years between the April Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985 and 1989. Here we should recall the words of M.S. Gorbachev: "While in the first stage the process of democratization to a significant degree was determined by the initiatives and practical work of the party and it occurred as it were from above, at present this process to a decisive degree is characterized by a powerful movement from below, by a movement of the broadest masses of workers. This is the main thing."

The national referendum, as the past elections of the USSR People's Deputies are now being called, has clearly shown that the people are in favor of perestroika, of its acceleration, deepening and development to its complete logical conclusion, when shoddy work, lazy thought and indifference to any injustice will trouble each of us like a sharp nail in our own boot.

At present, we are all expecting a very great deal from the Congress of People's Deputies and clearly much more than can be realistically expected during the days of its work. This impatience is humanly understandable as in any new undertaking, in renewing our own socialist home, numerous difficulties of all sorts constantly arise. And we very much want to get rid of them faster. And the guarantee for this, regardless of all the difficulties of growth, has still been rather soundly based. We are learning, we are maturing, and we are being enriched with the experience of living in the new manner. It is quite right that perestroika is frequently compared with the oncoming spring. The vital forces unleashed by it have not only put down strong, well-rooted shoots but are already beginning to produce their fruit. And one of the most delicate indicators of renewal in the republic is at present, probably, the perestroika of economic management on the basis of self-management and self-financing. With each passing day it becomes ever-clearer

that a radical economic reform is moving up the "steps of independence" from brigade to shop, from enterprise to sector, in occupying constantly new "floors" of its national economic complex.

The dynamic economic development of the republic is eloquently characterized by the following figures: over the last 3 years, national income has increased by almost 6 percent. And what is particularly pleasing, the pace of favorable changes is steadily continuing to grow. For example, in the first quarter of the current year by increasing labor productivity by 3.7 percent, virtually all the increase in the production volume was obtained in industry.

And the guidelines in this constantly accelerating movement are clear for the future. Primarily these are: accelerating the democratic principles in production management, its reconstruction and technical reequipping and the greatest possible intensification. Thus, the labor collectives have elected one out of every ten leader and some 1,700 different specialist positions were filled on a competitive basis. These and other factors have made it possible to bring about a significant rise in the effectiveness of social production and reduce the number of enterprises operating at a loss. For instance, in Guryev the workers have leased a one-time lagging housing construction combine and on the same area with the same equipment and with a fewer number of workers have begun not only to fulfill the plans but also to significantly exceed them. The Kazakh Gosstroy, having spotted a clear sprout of the new, as a whole for the republic plans to turn over another 12 housing construction combines and 30 industrial enterprises to lessees.

At the same time, new approaches are being worked out in developing the agroindustrial complex. Here priority has been given to the ubiquitous dissemination of progressive forms of organizing labor and wages, to strengthening the private plots, and to reducing unproductive expenditures and losses of already produced products. Suffice it to say that recently the number of farms which have converted to leasing and which have introduced progressive forms of the organization of labor and wages in all their subdivisions has increased by several fold.

Life shows that the approaches assumed here have been generally correct. Over the last 3 years, they have made it possible in the republic to increase the per capita meat consumption by almost 10 kg, milk by 33 kg and vegetables by 6 kg. The store shelves in Tselinograd, Kokchetav and Kustanay have become even richer and more diverse and here the purchasers are offered a minimum of 35-40 types of meat convenience foods and subproducts and up to 20 types of sausages and smoked products.

However, we are still far from completely eliminating the stress in the republic in the area of food products. Ahead of us lies great and constant work to implement the Food

Program and carry out the new agrarian policy worked out at the March (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

For this very important undertaking for the fate of perestroyka we must set to work in a truly energetic and bold manner and even with a certain degree of risk as otherwise we will not completely overcome the inertia caused by the alienation of the peasants from the land, the bureaucratic inhibition and will not bring about a fundamental change for the better. Here there is truly an unlimited field of activity for the local Soviets which are presently receiving all local power. In a number of republic regions they are already beginning to employ this power in an intelligent manner, in particular, in East Kazakhstan, Kustanay and Chimkent Oblasts, in independently working out the principles of full cost accounting and self-financing without glancing "up above." Positive changes at present are also occurring where with proper support from the deputies a green light has been given to leasing, private and family farms.

The situation of milk production shows what enormous reserves and opportunities are concealed here. In the first quarter of the current year, in comparison with the corresponding period of last year, 41,000 more tons of milk were purchased. And 1/2 of this increase has come from the private farms. Such a valuable peasant initiative must be supported and developed in every possible way.

A good deal remains to be done also in organizing cooperation between industry and agriculture on a mutually advantageous basis. This means the deliveries of equipment, building materials and technology to the countryside, the erection of food industry enterprises in the cities and the development of subsidiary farms and collective orchard and truck farming.

In many industrial centers of the republic they are not waiting for any instructions on this but have immediately set to work. Thus, in Pavlodar at the beginning of the current year, the industrial enterprises transferred over 5 million rubles to a special bank account for the development of the kolkhozes and sovkhazes and the city facilities of the oblagroprom [oblast agroindustrial committee]. In speaking about the perestroyka of the economy and its sharp focus on social processes and on the redistribution of resources and reserves in favor of satisfying the urgent needs of the public, we cannot help but note one important feature. Where the local soviets are up to things, where they skillfully use their sharply increased powers and have set to work to solve the new tasks without the still customary hesitations and various references to the notorious "objective" difficulties, the long-awaited and hard-won changes are coming about faster. And these changes themselves, as a rule, are of a consistent and irreversible nature, they are marked by profoundness and conform fully to the demands which have been raised by our party's course of a revolutionary renewal of socialism.

And what could be more persuasive proof of the loyalty to this course than the improved living conditions of many hundreds and thousands of people, each of us, the emancipated initiative, the opportunity to show oneself in a specific undertaking essential for society. A clear example of this is the number of new homes which has sharply increased in the republic. Over the last 3 years alone, the urban and rural workers have received above the plan over 1.7 million m<sup>2</sup> of housing. This means that additional tens of thousands of families have moved into new apartments and more than 40 percent of the persons on waiting lists have improved their living conditions.

Certainly before perestroyka many inhabitants of Kazakhstan could not even dream of such quick moves as they were tired of the fruitless waiting. And this is not surprising! The housing tension in our republic for a long time had been growing faster than we could relieve it. Among the construction workers, specialists, various levels of leaders and a number of the people's elected, a rather persistent conviction arose of the impossibility of getting things off dead center by their own forces. As for the broad masses of workers, the inertia of empty promises, the contradiction between the pompous phrases about the millions of square meters of housing completed in Kazakhstan and the extremely slow advance up the waiting list for obtaining it caused not only disappointment but outright mistrust, social apathy and political infantilism.

The profound changes which began in the republic at the start of the second year of the five-year plan literally in all spheres of social life shattered the stereotype of previous notions concerning the actual possibilities of the housing conveyor line: the Housing-91 Program arose which was aimed within a period of 5 years at providing apartments to all who were on the waiting lists on 1 January 1987. Its ideas, it can be said without exaggeration, in reaching the hearts of each resident of Kazakhstan and reinforced by the restoration of social justice in the allocating of housing encouraged everyone—from the ordinary construction worker to the minister—to show tenacity, initiative and entrepreneurship in seeking out new approaches and out-of-the-ordinary solutions. Individual and cooperative construction developed widely as did the erection of housing by the direct labor method. And the result was that for 2 years running the annual quota for completing housing was fulfilled in the republic by the time of the anniversary of Great October. Housing is being erected ahead of the plan during the current year as well. As a whole, in terms of the pace of housing construction, Kazakhstan is now in first place in the nation.

Many other aspects of increasing prosperity and more fully satisfying the needs of the Soviet man have also been put at the center of attention and concern of our society which is carrying out the noble task of disclosing the human face of socialism. In particular, take such a difficult problem for Kazakhstan as consumer goods. Even recently over 60 percent of them were shipped in from outside the republic. Up to the present the volume

of such deliveries has been reduced to 43 percent. Over the 3 years of the five-year plan, the output of consumer goods (minus alcoholic beverages) has risen by 1.5-fold in comparison with 1985.

The restructuring of Kazakhstan industry is also beginning to bear fruit. And above all, the giving of a stable and planned nature to the outstripping of the end production results over intermediate ones, the consistent concluding of the "extraction—processing" cycle everywhere and the intensive forming of scientific-intensive sectors. Just in the area of light industry over the next few years, the republic will build over 80 enterprises. And this is not counting the 115 industrial complexes based on prefabricated buildings from light metal structural elements, the so-called modules, the installation of which has been going on at full pitch since last year. This is also one of the vivid signs of perestroika.

Much has also been done in the republic to eliminate the disproportions in the socioeconomic and cultural development of its individual oblasts and rayons. But at present particular attention is being given to "the deep interior" the population of which in a predominant majority is persons of the indigenous nationality.

The state of affairs here, it must be honestly admitted, is serious. Out of the 205 rural rayons in the republic, 71 have a very low level of social development and 30 of them are in a lamentable state. Recently a decision was taken to give them extraordinary social aid.

By a special decree of the Kazakhstan government it is planned, for example, in 1990 using funds from the republic budget to complete 200,000 m<sup>2</sup> of housing, in the 13th five-year plan to complete over a million m<sup>2</sup> of housing and build general education schools with 63,500 places. The plan is to erect first in the lagging rayons hospitals and polyclinics, housing-communal and cultural-service facilities, that is, a broad and all-encompassing range of measures to improve public health.

Perestroika, as a truly revolutionary renewal of all spheres of life, cannot be conceived of without transferring to the soviets all power, consolidating the social forces, nations and nationalities, their solidarity and mobilizing not only the material but also the spiritual and moral forces to the great and noble undertaking.

Let us recall the recent past, that is, what was customary for many until the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In Kazakhstan, as in the other republics, from the high rostrums the speakers constantly asserted the "monolithic moral and political unity," the "shining, diamond-like" friendship of peoples and the "once-and-for-all resolved nationality question." But behind the pompous assurances were concealed flagrant problems and violations in the national composition, in the recruitment and placement of personnel and disregard for the long prevalent problems of the development of the languages and culture of

the representatives of over 100 nations and nationalities inhabiting one of the largest Soviet republics.

At present, it is rather clear to all what were the results of this, just what this all entailed.

The party organizations, the soviets, the cultural institutions and the social organizations set to work energetically on everything related to this diverse and very difficult undertaking, in endeavoring in it to reach out to every man. Here they immediately defined the "sore spots." Political and ideological action was concentrated on them and this was done in a situation of broad democratization and glasnost and real involvement in resolving key questions of ordinary workers, the youth and veterans who previously over the decades had been urged to be "active," but in fact had been left in the role of "cogs" which had been assigned to them during the evil Stalinist times.

The people of Kazakhstan undoubtedly recall how everywhere they began decisively to overcome the negative and stagnation phenomena and how a hostile situation began to be created over the abuses of the various levels of officials who had "moved up" because of coming from the same area or by nepotism. Thus, the path was cleared for the arrival of new, trustworthy cadres, real proponents of perestroika.

Important turning points in raising the level of interethnic relations were the decrees on the study of Kazakh and Russian languages and German as mother tongues and so forth and these were followed up by concrete work in implementing them. Much was done also to activate scientific potential on research on the questions of the socioeconomic and cultural development of the republic and improving nationality and interethnic relations.

Particular attention is being given to the ideological-moral, international and patriotic education of the youth, and to their civil development. In their work with students the party and soviet bodies, the Komsomol organizations, the institutions of learning, as well as the cultural and sports institutions have begun to rely less on general appeals and more on direct contact and quick response to requests and needs. In the cultural sphere as well to a significant degree we have eliminated the empty sham and in an evermore concrete and effective manner we are settling the problems raised by renewal and which concern and attract the viewers and listeners.

Beginning to pay off is the concern for a constant attracting of persons to movie and theater auditoriums, museums, libraries, for disseminating cultural services for as large a number of the population as possible, including the residents of the most distant settlements.

Naturally in this context the role of the creative unions also grows. Their efforts are being directed against manifestation of group exclusiveness, localism and complacency, at a vivid and profound depiction of modern realities and at an uncompromising struggle of the new against stagnation and in the course of which humanism, justice and morality

are established. At the same time, the names of persons who made a major contribution to the development of Kazakhstan and who were wrongly "eradicated" from history in the bad times are being restored.

The real shifts in the political, organizational and indoctrinational activities, in cultural services and in improving interethnic relations can be seen just as realistically in the social sense of the republic inhabitants and in their assessment of the existing dynamics of perestroyka processes. We feel that persuasive proof of this is the results of the recent elections of the USSR People's Deputies. Both in the course of the preparations for them and in the process of voting itself, the people of Kazakhstan showed a high awareness of their civil duty. The percentage of persons voting in the elections was one of the highest in the nation. The elections became a concrete proof of the approbation and support for perestroyka, a confirmation of the correctness of the path chosen by the party and the people and a great tribute to the people's elected.

But as was emphasized at the April (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, democracy is not only the broadening of real rights but also a strengthening of discipline and organization. It must be confessed as well that the broadening of glasnost and liberties has often been used by various sorts of small groupings of those who, in pretending to be supporters of perestroyka, are in fact its strong opponents. There have been announcements about this in the press from various places and many of us in the republic ourselves have met repeatedly with such individuals. This is a question primarily of the representatives of various extremist initiative social formations. We must say directly that in recent years they have begun to grow in some places, literally like mushrooms after the rain. Certainly, such "initiators" must be given an uncompromising rebuff. Here we must not have appeasement, indecisiveness or the notorious position of that is no concern of mine.

However, there are also many such initiative social formations which sincerely desire to help, for example, in accelerating a healthier environment and involve more workers in constructive participation in the management of production and social affairs. In the republic they should receive proper support from the party and soviet bodies and the public. Certainly their actions do not go beyond constructive socialist ends and are objectively aimed at accelerating the socioeconomic development and improving the prosperity of the people.

In a word, we have many initiative groups operating in the channel of perestroyka. But there are also those which are confused in certain regards. For these we must be particularly attentive and explain the errors and help them in becoming useful for the cause of socialist renewal. Here we must not allow hurry, hotheadedness, or vehemence in our proofs and conclusions. In the forefront there should be the responsibility of the citizens and above all the communists for the unswerving observance of the Soviet laws and the decrees of the appropriate levels.

In steadily and creatively adding to their contribution to the creation of new material and spiritual goods and in working for beneficial changes in all areas of life both for themselves and for all the peoples of the motherland, the people of Kazakhstan are moving steadily forward, they are assessing the successes of their republic in an objective and proper manner, they are frankly and boldly pointing to shortcomings, including those committed recently, and are working steadily to eliminate them. The words come to mind voiced by M.S. Gorbachev at a meeting with the representatives of the labor collectives at the cosmodrome and city of Leninsk: "Here in the infinite steppes of Kazakhstan, one feels a sense of pride for the reason and deeds of the Soviet people, for our Soviet fatherland. Here one feels more strongly the greatness and might of the nation of October and its enormous accomplishments."

For this reason, the communists and workers of the republic, in defiance of the difficulties and in overcoming them, are backing the party and are doing more and more to establish the democratic, human face of socialism. This unstinting and noble labor has been going on now for 4-plus years. We are renewing, rebuilding and adding to our socialist home. We are strengthening its economic foundation, possibly not as quickly as one might wish, but quite consistently, "brick by brick," we are laying the bases for the political and social reforms with the broad and bright "windows" of democracy and glasnost.

At the same time, in carrying out our strategic tasks, in no instance must we overlook our, so to speak, immediate, tactical aims. As was pointed out at the April (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we must not at present disregard the prime vital problems which exist in society and which require an immediate solution. Certainly these largely determine the social attitudes of the people and hence, ultimately, how consistently and how quickly perestroyka itself will go on.

Of course, everyone realizes that the economy is not to be restructured in a single sweep, the existing stereotypes will not be shattered all at once, but at the same time it is perfectly valid not to want to tolerate the fact that at times tasks which could be resolved today are put off until "tomorrow." Completely valid are the complaints of interruptions in the supply of elementary articles which long could have been in abundance. We are all dissatisfied with the organization of trade and the service sphere, municipal transport and the utility system, by the neglected state of many of our "cultural centers," by the indecisiveness in the struggle against mismanagement, violations of law and order, as well as by the dissatisfactory ecological state of many population points.

Yes, from the heights of 4 1/2 years of social renewal at present we can clearly see all the weak elements in our "construction scaffolding." The mistakes in the work of certain party organizations and a certain infantilism in the activities of a number of soviets of varying rank, the insufficient elaboration of the economic mechanism and the half-heartedness of many adopted decisions.

And here completely natural questions arise: What about the USSR people's deputies, those for whom the people of Kazakhstan have already voted on 26 March and in the following round of elections? What is their position, their personal contribution to eliminating the urgent problems? Certainly 6 weeks have already passed since the elections and it is completely logical to assume that from the very outset they would endeavor to justify the mandate of trust, without waiting to embody their platforms in real and important matters. But we see, alas, something different: only a few-score of the people's elect in the republic have approached their new status with a full measure of exactingness and responsibility.

These questions are serious also because a new election campaign will commence soon for the republic and local soviets. And again they must pass the exam of meeting the high demands of perestroika. And those who still continue to state that "the position will provide," cannot pass this exam. Always and in everything the true criterion for assessing a man is his deeds.

We must put our house completely in order, as if it had a good owner! This certainly is one of the most important conclusions of the April (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. At present, under the conditions of inflationary processes there is probably no more acute problem than reducing losses and unproductive expenses and a real fight against mismanagement and wastefulness which are deep-rooted virtually in all spheres of activity. And just, as they say, how things have come to such a state is largely—let us be honest—our fault. It is essential to look the truth in the eyes, as was pointed out at the Plenum, and realize that many have lost the habit of working, saying that they are paid merely for showing up on the job.

An indispensable condition for the development of democracy is the complete strengthening of discipline. At present, it is not understood as the blind execution of at times contradictory and obsolete instructions but rather as a truly creative, efficient and thrifty attitude toward the job. This must not only be understood but, as they say, accepted wholeheartedly. Otherwise, even the best, most correct and most democratic decisions will inevitably "slip through."

Thus, just 2 ½ weeks remain until the opening of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. There can be no doubt that at it the most urgent problems will be raised and the solutions will be truly fateful for the entire nation.

A representative detachment of the people's elect from Kazakhstan will participate in the work of the Congress. The people of Kazakhstan are convinced that in discussing any questions they will show wisdom, political strength, social activeness worthy of our great motherland and of the hopes and expectations of each of us. For this reason it is difficult to refrain from giving the deputies from Kazakhstan one other piece of advice: look at everything, as they say, from the heights of the Kremlin and not from your local "bell tower." Fight for such decisions which will

serve the cause of further strengthening the USSR, the vital interests of both the entire Soviet people and each nation and nationality individually and a general rise in the prosperity of the people.

### **Uzbek Draft Law on Languages Published for Public Discussion**

#### **Supreme Soviet Instructions**

18300740 Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA  
in Russian 20 Jun 89 p 1

["Decree of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Draft Law of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic on Languages"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet hereby decrees:

1. That the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Draft Law on Languages, which has been presented to the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions for legislative proposals on matters of interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing, public education, and culture, be submitted for public discussion. That the draft law be published in republic and oblast newspapers.
2. That the Presidium of the Karakalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet, the executive committees of the oblast and Tashkent city soviets of people's deputies, ministries, state committees and departments, and organs of mass media of the Uzbek SSR organize the discussion and generalize proposals and comments submitted concerning the draft law by people's deputies, citizens, labor collectives, and social organizations.
3. That the discussion of the Uzbek SSR draft law on languages be set for a period of two months from the day of its publication. That generalized proposals and comments on the draft law be submitted to the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet once every 15 days.
4. That a working group be formed out of members of the commissions for legislative proposals on matters of interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing, public education, and culture within the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet to make a careful study of proposals and comments on the draft Law on Languages.
5. That the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet commissions for legislative proposals on matters of interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing, public education, and culture make the necessary corrections and amendments to the draft Law on Languages on the basis of the results of the public discussion and submit it to the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet for subsequent submission to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] M. Ibragimov, chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet;



*L. Bekkulbekova, secretary of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.*

*Tashkent, 18 May 1989.*

#### **Text of Draft Law**

*18300740 Tashkent KOMSOMOLET'S UZBEKISTANA  
in Russian 20 Jun 89 p 1*

["Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Draft Law on Languages"]

[Text] The present Law on Languages sets forth the legal foundations of the official use of the Uzbek language as the state language on the territory of the republic. The law ensures the functioning of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication of the peoples of the USSR as well as the use of other national languages in the territory of the Uzbek SSR.

Citizens of the Uzbek SSR are equal regardless of what their native language is. The equal rights of the languages of the peoples of Uzbekistan constitute an inseparable element of the equal rights of nations and nationalities living in the territory of the republic. The state ensures all citizens' opportunity to use the Uzbek language, Russian, and other languages in exercising their socio-economic, cultural, political, and personal rights and freedoms.

Legislative regulation in the sphere of the use of languages in the territory of the Uzbek SSR is oriented toward the harmonious development of Uzbek and other languages, growth of the socioeconomic potential of the republic, revival, development, and mutual enrichment of national cultures, strengthening of people's friendship, solidarity, and cooperation, and also the strengthening of the internationalist unity of all nations and nationalities of Uzbekistan.

#### **Section I. General Provisions**

##### **Article 1. Legal Status of the Uzbek Language**

Uzbek shall be the state language of the Uzbek SSR.

The Uzbek SSR shall exercise governmental concern for the comprehensive development of the Uzbek language and provide for its use in state and social organs, institutions of culture, science, public education, upbringing, health care, and other spheres of social life.

The status of the Uzbek language as the official state language shall not encroach upon the constitutional right of citizens of other nationalities living in the territory of the Uzbek SSR to make use of their own native language and of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication.

##### **Article 2. Guarantee of Development of Languages**

The Uzbek SSR shall ensure respectful treatment of all languages used in the republic and shall create conditions for their free development.

##### **Article 3. The Russian Language as the Medium of Interethnic Communication**

The Russian language shall be the medium of interethnic communication in the Uzbek SSR.

Official correspondence beyond the borders of the Uzbek SSR shall be drawn up chiefly in the Russian language or in another language acceptable to the parties.

Activities of state and social organs of the Uzbek SSR outside the borders of the republic shall be conducted in Uzbek and Russian.

##### **Article 4. The Competence of the Uzbek SSR in the Sphere of Legislation Concerning the Development and Use of Languages**

The Uzbek SSR shall have the right to resolve any issue concerning the development and use of languages in the territory of the republic unless it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the USSR Constitution and other legislative acts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The present Law of the Uzbek SSR shall stipulate the principles of interrelations, legal status, and spheres of use of the Uzbek language, Russian, and other languages in the territory of the republic.

##### **Article 5. Competence of the Karakalpak ASSR in the Sphere of Legislation Concerning the Development and Use of Languages**

The Karakalpak ASSR shall have the right to resolve any issue concerning the development and use of languages in the territory of the autonomous republic unless this be assigned to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR by the Uzbek SSR Constitution and the present law.

Outside the limits of the jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR, the Karakalpak ASSR shall have the right to stipulate the legal status of the language of the autonomous republic, including the establishment of it as the state language.

##### **Article 6. Legislation of the Uzbek SSR and the Karakalpak ASSR Concerning the Development and Use of Languages**

Legislation of the Uzbek SSR concerning languages consists of the Uzbek SSR Constitution, the present law, and other normative acts of the Uzbek SSR and the Karakalpak ASSR promulgated in accordance with them concerning the development and use of languages.

#### **Section II. Rights and Guarantees of the Citizen in the Choice of Language**

##### **Article 7. The Language in Which Citizens Submit Proposals, Declarations, and Complaints**

Citizens of the Uzbek SSR shall have the right to submit proposals, declarations, and complaints to state and social organs in the state language or in the language they speak.

**Article 8. The Language in Which Citizens Deal With Workers in the Sphere of Services**

In dealing with workers in the sphere of services (trade, medical aid, communications, transport, various kinds of consumer services, and so on), citizens of the Uzbek SSR may use the state language, the language of interethnic communication, or another language of national groups living in places of compact settlement which they speak. Workers in the sphere of services shall not have the right to refuse service on grounds of lack of knowledge of the state language or of Russian.

Workers in the sphere of services shall have a knowledge of both the Uzbek language and Russian on a level necessary to perform their professional duties.

**Section III. Language in the Activities of Organs of State Authority and Administration, Social Organizations**

**Article 9. The Language of Operation of State Organs of the Uzbek SSR**

In the activities of organs of state authority and administration of the Uzbek SSR, as a general rule, Uzbek shall be the language of meetings and other conferences. Persons not proficient in Uzbek shall be provided with translation into Russian or into a language of national groups. Documents shall be kept in Uzbek and, when necessary, in Russian.

In places of compact settlement of national groups, local organs of state authority and administration may use the native language alongside Uzbek or Russian.

**Article 10. The Language of Publication of Laws and Other Legal Acts**

Legislative acts of the highest organs of state authority and administration of the Uzbek SSR shall be enacted in Uzbek, translated into Russian, and published in the official publications of the republic in Uzbek with translation into Russian.

Legislative acts of local organs of state authority and administration in places of compact settlement of national groups shall be enacted and published in Uzbek, Russian, and the language of the appropriate nationality.

**Article 11. The Language of Communication With All-Union Organs and Foreign States**

In relations with all-union organs of state authority and administration, organs of state authority and administration of the Uzbek SSR shall use the Russian language; in relations with state organs of other union and autonomous republics, they shall use Uzbek, Russian, and a language acceptable to both sides.

In relations with foreign states, use shall be made of a language acceptable to both sides, taking account of international agreements and established practices.

**Section IV. Language in the Work of Institutions, Enterprises, and Organizations**

**Article 12. Language in the Work of Institutions, Enterprises, and Organizations**

In official dealings between workers and an administrator of an institution, enterprise, or organization, the language of communication and information shall be chosen by the subordinate worker. An administrator may use Uzbek or Russian as the language of communication and information.

**Article 13. The Language of Documents**

The language of documents in institutions, enterprises, and organizations located in the territory of the Uzbek SSR shall be Uzbek and Russian.

In places of compact settlement of national groups, documents may be drawn up in the languages of these groups. In such cases, documents shall be duplicated in the state language or in Russian.

**Article 14. Official Correspondence in the Work of Institutions, Enterprises, and Organizations**

In correspondence with organs of state authority and administration of the Uzbek SSR, as well as correspondence among themselves, institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the republic shall use Uzbek and, when necessary, Russian.

Institutions, enterprises, and organizations located in the territory of the Uzbek SSR shall conduct correspondence with institutions, enterprises, and organizations outside the republic in Uzbek, Russian, or some other language acceptable to the parties.

**Article 15. Accounting-Statistical and Financial Documentation in Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations**

Accounting-statistical and financial documentation in enterprises, institutions, and organizations located in the territory of the Uzbek SSR shall be conducted in Uzbek and Russian, and reports and financial documents to be sent outside the republic shall be drawn up in Russian or in a language acceptable to the other side.

**Article 16. Creation of Conditions for the Study of Language**

Institutions, enterprises, and organizations located in the territory of the Uzbek SSR shall provide their labor collectives with conditions for the study of Uzbek, Russian, or—in places of compact settlement of national groups—the language of the relevant nationality, on a level sufficient for the performance of official duties.

The republic shall support and encourage citizens' striving to study the languages of the peoples of the USSR and foreign languages.

**Section V. Language in the Activities of Organs of Justice, Arbitration, Notary, and Registration of Acts of Civil Status**

**Article 17. Language in the Work of Organs of Justice**

Legal proceedings in the Uzbek SSR shall be conducted in Uzbek, Karakalpak, or a language acceptable to the majority of the population of a given locality.

Persons involved in a case who are not proficient in the language of the court proceedings shall have the right to make declarations, give testimony, appear in court, and make petitions in their native language, and also make use of the services of an interpreter in accordance with procedures established by existing legislation.

Investigative and court documents shall be provided to persons taking part in a case, translated into the language they are proficient in, in accordance with procedures established by existing legislation.

**Article 18. Review and Formulation of Cases Concerning Administrative Infractions**

During the review of cases concerning administrative infractions, persons called to administrative accountability, as well as other persons taking part in the case, shall have the right to use their native language and, if they are not proficient in the language of the administrative proceedings, to use the services of an interpreter.

The report [protokol] concerning the administrative infraction shall be drawn up in Uzbek. If the person called to administrative accountability is not proficient in Uzbek, he shall be provided with a translation of the content of the report into Russian or an acceptable language.

**Article 19. Language in the Work of Organs of State Arbitration**

Organs of state arbitration of the Uzbek SSR shall review economic disputes between institutions, enterprises, and organizations in Uzbek or in Russian.

**Article 20. The Language of Notary Work**

Notary work in state notary offices and executive committees of rayon, city, settlement, and kishlak soviets of people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR shall be conducted in Uzbek, Russian, or a language acceptable for the majority of the population of the given locality.

If the applicant does not know the language in which the work is conducted, the texts of documents that are drawn up shall be translated for him by the state notary or other official performing notary work, or by an interpreter, into his native language or into Russian.

**Article 21. Official Work in the Organs of Registration of Acts of Civil Status**

Official work in organs of registration of acts of civil status of the Uzbek SSR shall be conducted in the state language and in Russian.

**Article 22. Language in the Work of Attorneys' Collegiums**

Citizens of the Uzbek SSR shall be provided legal aid as stipulated by existing legislation, by attorneys' collegiums, in Uzbek or in Russian and, in places of compact settlement of national groups, in the language of the relevant nationality.

**Section VI. Language in the Sphere of Public Education, Science, and Culture**

**Article 23. Freedom of Choice of the Language of Instruction**

Citizens of the Uzbek SSR shall be guaranteed free choice of the language of instruction.

This right shall be guaranteed by the creation of a broad network of preschool institutions and schools with instruction in Uzbek, Russian, or another language, with consideration of the interests of national groups living in compact settlements in a particular locality, permanent and temporary courses in Uzbek, Russian, or another language, by the creation (when necessary) of classes, groups, and circles in schools, professional-technical schools, and secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, for the instruction of citizens in the native language.

Administrators, educators, and upbringing personnel in preschool and educational institutions shall be proficient in the language of instruction of the relevant institution.

**Article 24. Concerning Old Uzbek Written Literature**

The Uzbek SSR shall provide help to citizens desiring to study the Old Uzbek written literature based on the Arabic script. For these purposes, the appropriate scientific-pedagogical cadres shall be trained and historical-literary sources shall be published.

**Article 25. Guarantees of the Exercise of the Right to an Education**

Citizens of the Uzbek SSR shall be guaranteed the right to obtain a general secondary education in Uzbek or in Russian and, in places where national groups live in compact settlements, in the language of the relevant nationality.

The main languages of instruction in the republic's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions shall be Uzbek and Russian and, where the appropriate conditions require, other languages as well.

**Article 26. The Compulsory Study of Languages**

The Uzbek SSR shall provide citizens with instruction in the Uzbek language as a compulsory subject of the

curriculum in general-education schools, vocational-technical schools, and secondary specialized and higher educational institutions where instruction is not conducted in Uzbek, and also instruction in the Russian language as a compulsory subject of the curriculum in general-education schools, vocational-technical schools, and secondary specialized and higher educational institutions where instruction is not conducted in Russian, with a graduation examination to be conducted in the relevant language.

For national groups living in compact settlements in the republic, conditions shall be created for the study of their native language in general-education schools, in courses of study, and in circles.

#### **Article 27. The Language of Scientific Work**

The Uzbek SSR shall ensure the free choice of the language of scientific work and shall guarantee the right of submitting scientific works and defending them in pursuance of a scientific degree in Uzbek or any other language, in accordance with the capabilities of scientific institutions and academic councils.

In order to develop and perfect the language of science, measures shall be taken in the Uzbek SSR to compile scientific-technical and social-political terminology in the Uzbek language.

#### **Article 28. The Language of Education Methodology, Artistic, and Scientific-Technical Literature and the Mass Media**

The Uzbek SSR shall provide for the publication of educational methodological, artistic, and scientific-technical literature, newspapers and journals, and the propaganda of accomplishments in science and culture by the mass media in Uzbek as well as in Russian and the language of national groups living in compact settlements in the territory of the republic.

Republic television and radio broadcasts shall be conducted primarily in Uzbek as well as in Russian. Television and radio broadcasts shall also be organized in the languages of national groups living in compact settlements in the territory of the Uzbek SSR.

The Uzbek SSR shall promote the creation of films and other audio-visual works in Uzbek, to be translated subsequently into Russian or other languages.

#### **Section VII. Languages of Other Nations and National Groups**

##### **Article 29. Consideration of the Linguistic Interests of Nations and National Groups**

In places of compact settlement, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Uighurs, Koreans, Turks, Central Asian Jews, and others shall have the right to obtain an education, deal with organs of state

authority and state administration, to press and information materials in their native language, to comprehensive cultural development, and to the creation of national cultural societies and centers.

#### **Section VIII. Names of Administrative-Territorial Units. Personal Names**

##### **Article 30. Names of Administrative-Territorial Units**

In the Uzbek SSR, names of cities, settlements, kishlaks, squares, streets, and other territorial entities, institutions, enterprises, and organizations shall have a single designation in its national form and shall be given in the Uzbek language, with translation into Russian, and, where necessary, the languages of national groups in places of compact settlement.

##### **Article 31. Spelling of Surnames and Personal Names**

The spelling of personal names, fathers' names [otchestva], and surnames shall be stipulated in appropriate reference books. When converting Uzbek personal names, fathers' names, and surnames into other languages, the specifics of their spelling shall be retained.

In the writing and use of personal names, fathers' names, and surnames, the traditions of nations and nationalities as well as language patterns shall be observed.

#### **Section IX. Signs and Information**

##### **Article 32. Texts of Official Seals, Stamps, and Blanks**

The texts of official seals, stamps, and blanks of institutions, enterprises, and organizations shall be in Uzbek and duplicated in Russian.

The texts of official seals, stamps, and blanks of national cultural societies shall be in Uzbek along with the language they have chosen.

##### **Article 33. Texts of Graphic Information**

Signs, announcements, advertisements, price lists, and other graphic information shall be written in Uzbek and Russian.

Visual information shall be arranged as follows: on the left or on top, text in Uzbek; on the right or below, text in Russian, and executed in letters of the same size. Oral information (advertising, announcements, and so on) shall be given first in Uzbek and then in Russian.

In places where national groups live in compact settlements, the aforementioned visual or oral information may be executed as well in the language of the relevant nationality.

##### **Article 34. Postal and Telegraph Correspondence**

Within the territory of the Uzbek SSR, postal and telegraph correspondence shall be formulated in Uzbek or in Russian; correspondence to be sent outside the republic (except for international materials) shall be in Russian.

#### Article 35. Labels and Markings on Goods

Labels on goods, markings, and instructions for the use of goods manufactured in the Uzbek SSR shall contain the necessary information in Uzbek and in Russian as well as, where necessary, another language.

#### Section X. Responsibility for Violation of Legislation on Languages

##### Article 36. Responsibility for Violation of Legislation on Languages

In the Uzbek SSR, a scornful or hostile attitude toward any national language shall be prohibited. Violation of the right of citizens to the choice of language, deliberate discrimination against citizens on grounds of language, including in the sphere of labor relations, in organs of state authority and administration, in social and voluntary organizations, and in cooperative or other organs; the creation of barriers and restrictions contrary to the constitutional principles of Leninist nationality policy in regard to language use; the institution of privileges; or any other violations of USSR and Uzbek SSR legislation concerning languages, shall be prohibited and shall entail responsibility in accordance with existing legislation.

Officials shall be prohibited from refusing to accept or review proposals, declarations, and complaints on grounds of lack of knowledge of the language, and actions of the sort that hinder citizens' exercise of their right to the free choice of language of upbringing and education shall entail responsibility as stipulated by existing legislation of the USSR and the Uzbek SSR.

#### Section XI. Concluding Provisions

##### Article 37. Observance of the Norms of the Uzbek Language

In spheres of official functioning of the state language, existing norms of the Uzbek literary language shall be observed.

##### Article 38. Procedure for Formulating and Stipulating the Norms of the Uzbek Language

The norms of the Uzbek literary language shall be formulated and stipulated by the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences and other organizations empowered to do so. These norms shall go into effect after being approved by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

##### Article 39. Application of the Law

The Uzbek SSR Law on Languages shall be put into effect by stages.

The stages by which the law shall be put into effect, and the organizational and material-technical measures to implement them, shall be determined by the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

#### Uzbek First Secretary Meets With Central Asian Muslim Leader

18300685a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
19 May 89 p 1

[UzTAG report: "Discussion at the Uzbek CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The first secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, R. N. Nishanov, received the chairman of the presidium of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad Yusuf.

A discussion took place, in the course of which R. N. Nishanov congratulated the mufti on his election as people's deputy of the USSR and wished him success in his future work as a deputy. He talked about the course of restructuring in the republic, about the measures being undertaken by party, soviet, and economic organs in regard to the acceleration of economic and social development, and he expressed the confidence that the believers will take active part in the solution of the tasks of economic and cultural construction, which require the unity of all forces of society.

Attention was given to the fact that some unlawful actions on the part of fanatically-inclined people take place, cases of the violation of existing legislation on religious cults. Such manifestations are not conducive to the interrelationship between the state and the religious organizations, and in essence prevent the successful implementation of the process of restructuring.

The mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad Yusuf gave information about the results of the kurultay [general assembly] of the Muslims of the region, about the course of implementation of its decisions, and expressed gratitude for returning, to the believers, the Muslim relic of the Koran of Caliph Osman and a number of religious structures, and for the opening of new mosques. He talked about the peacemaking activity of the religious organizations of the Muslims and participation in the "Miloserdie" [Mercy] Program.

In the course of the discussion, other questions were also touched on, which are connected with the further strengthening of inter-religious relations and the role and place of religious organizations in the upbringing of believing citizens in the spirit of loyalty, patriotism, and internationalism.

M. I. Ibragimov, the chairman of the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet, took part in the meeting.

#### Armenian CP Buro on Internal Procedural, Structural Changes

18300685b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian  
21 May 89 p 1

[Armenpress report: "At the Armenian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] A regular session of the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro took place.

A memorandum of the general department of the Central Committee on the further improvement of the practice of the work with documents and the examination of questions in the Armenian CP Central Committee was examined. It was noted the trend toward the reduction of the number of decrees adopted and the official correspondence between party, soviet and economic organs, and public organizations, and toward the increase of control work is continuing in the apparatus of the Armenian CP Central Committee apparatus. The daily living link of the workers of the apparatus of the Central Committee with the party committees and organizations, as well as with the labor collectives, is growing stronger and is expanding.

The most urgent questions of an organizational-political and ideological character, the development of democratization and glasnost, and work with cadres are being introduced for examination of the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro and Secretariat. A more careful selection of the problems requiring collective discussion is being secured. Many questions are being transmitted for examination of the appropriate soviet and economic organs.

At the same time, certain shortcomings are being overlooked in the structure of problems that are submitted for discussion. Few questions are submitted in regard to the generalization of the experience of the work of party committees and primary organizations in the conditions of restructuring and the development of criticism and self-criticism. In proposing for discussion quite a few urgent problems of socio-economic development, the departments of the Armenian CP Central Committee frequently accent attention exclusively on the economic aspect of the matter. Not always is the principle of a differentiated approach to the exposition of the directives and recommendations being addressed to party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol, and economic organs observed, and the amalgamation of their functions is being permitted. The execution of such documents is poorly controlled, and their effectiveness is insignificant.

In form and in essence, resolutions must bear a genuinely party character and more thoroughly disclose the political

methods of leadership and the forms of organizational and educational work in the labor collectives. In each one of such documents, the functions and responsibility of party, soviet and economic organs, as well as trade union, Komsomol and other public organizations must be strictly delimited.

It has been recognized as expedient to introduce into practice the preliminary discussion of draft resolutions in the departments of the Central Committee with participation of the members of the elected organs, the commissions which prepared documents, and other interested parties. The discussion assumes the profound analysis of all questions expounded in the draft questions, the collective elaboration of conclusions and proposals. These measures are called upon to raise the quality of the preparation of documents and to reduce the time periods of their examination in the collegial organs.

It was decided henceforth not to ask for written information from party committees and organizations, soviet, trade union, and economic organs, the work of which was heard in the Central Committee. About the results of the implementation of the resolutions in terms of these reports, the appropriate departments of Central Committee will inform the Armenian CP Central Committee after examining the state of affairs in the provinces.

As was noted at the session, it is necessary to improve the quality of information about the execution of resolutions. In their preparation, information should be set forth about the concrete results of the work, and people should not get carried away with the enumeration and detailed description of the organizational-political measures being carried out.

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro authorized the adoption of additional measures for the realization of the policy of the party for the restructuring of the party leadership, the improvement of the practice of the work with documents, the increase of their quality, and the reduction of unnecessary paper work.

Other urgent questions of the life of the republic were also examined at the session.

## Officials Seek Advances in Video Availability, VCR Production

### More Video Theaters, VCR's Planned

18300733 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in  
Russian 11 Jun 89 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Oleg Vladimirovich Uralov, general director of the Videofilm All-Union Creative PO, conducted by A. Ladynin: "Timely Interview: Do You Subscribe to the Video Channel?"]

[Text] Video is becoming more and more a part of our everyday lives. Whereas in the past people might have invited us over for tea, today those who own video systems may invite us to their homes to watch a movie. In short, the time has come to interpret this new phenomenon.

Today our guest is Oleg Uralov, general director of the Videofilm All-Union Creative PO, noted movie director and laureate of the USSR State Prize.

[Ladynin] Oleg Vladimirovich, as far as I know many of your plans may seem fantastic, so first of all let us try to assess realistically the current situation and understand why video is needed and how our country differs from the West in this regard.

[Uralov] I think that the present situation is the result of three factors. First of all, working in favor of video's popularity are people's high level of social activism and the diversity of their interests. In contrast to the cinema, television and radio, video can offer people the specific information they want at any given moment.

Secondly, we are justifiably proud of our culture, but without interaction with cultural achievements around the world its development, and I think you will agree, will be one-sided. Not to mention mutual penetration and mutual enrichment of our national cultural traditions. In this regard as well much can be accomplished through the use of videos.

The third factor is the amount and type of equipment available here. In our country there is still only a depressingly small number of privately-owned VCR's. At the present time they number roughly 2.3 million. In order to match the average European level, which is already 50 percent of all households, we would have to have 35 million VCR's (based on a total of 70 million families in our country).

Unfortunately there is no basis to hope that our industry will soon meet the demand for VCR's. I believe I am correct in saying that production of 200,000 units is planned for 1990. That is a drop in the bucket. Furthermore, that "drop" is already very outdated, comparable to mid-1970's technology. In my opinion it would make better sense to buy video equipment from the West: due to overproduction prices for VCR's there at the present time are relatively low, plus the technical level of the Western units is higher. Secondly, let us look ahead a bit

and give some thought to tomorrow as well as today. The future lies with digital and laser technology.

[Ladynin] Thus on the one hand there is considerable interest in video, yet on the other hands there is little reason to hope for rapid change for the better in the current situation. Is it in view of the shortage of video equipment that you have chosen the path of setting up video viewing rooms with projection equipment? Currently, as far as I am aware, there are already more than a thousand of these...

[Uralov] You are absolutely right. But opening video theaters is not the only way we are attempting to solve this problem. There are also other options. I am referring to the establishment of a paid television movie channel. This has already been done in other countries. This channel would function on a subscription basis and be financed by subscriber fees; essentially it would carry only movies, both old and new. As the experience of the French "Plus Channel" has shown, such a channel is very stable, with 94 percent permanent "subscribers." We propose that in our country as well it should be a commercial channel, but not in the Western sense, where profit is the key, but instead in the sense of its means of support being commercial.

Our entire Videofilm Association has purposely made the transition to a lease arrangement, even though we received a subsidy just last year. Quite frankly that was a risky move, but you can believe me when I tell you that it was backed up by economic calculations. You will recall that when Videofilm was established it was originally intended to serve only as a rental agency, yet today we own 40 hours of original programs. This year we are planning to produce 70 hours, 100 hours in 1990, and 300 hours in 1995...

[Ladynin] Just how realistic are all these plans?

[Uralov] They are all realistic. But I do not want your readers to get the impression that everything is easy and simple for us. Here is one example. In Moscow we have opened 20 video theaters, and the Moscow City Soviet did not contribute a single kopeck. Furthermore, the Moscow City Soviet has not yet implemented its decision to provide us with a building to house our technical center, even though that should have been done two years ago. As a result we have no place to store the equipment we have bought with hard currency; we are forced to lease a building in Sokolniki Park. This temporary arrangement does not suit us, nor does it suit the park. Even though we have already invested 250,000 rubles in repairs on the leased building we are constantly being threatened with eviction. Now the State Committee for Cinematography has turned over to us an unfinished, long since abandoned facility in Khimki-Khovrino. We are planning to move there in a couple of years.

But right now Videofilm is operating under very difficult conditions, virtually on enthusiasm alone. The majority of my colleagues have come to us from other studios,

leaving their comfortable positions behind. I myself have not done any film work in two years. But all these hardships are justified by the unique opportunities which have opened up before us. We are the first full-circle cinema enterprise in our country: we control both production and distribution.

One should not forget the social significance of this new undertaking. Videos can facilitate rapid change in the cultural situation in our country. That situation is, it seems to me, a very difficult one. Well, for example, we here in Moscow can only read in the newspapers about many shows presented at Moscow theaters. What about people living in Ryazan, for instance? Just try to get a ticket to the Bolshoi Theater. And it is not just the Bolshoi... The situation is no better for lovers of classical music, even though it has gotten easier to get tickets to rock concerts, for example. Yet we could make videos of all the most noteworthy theatrical premieres and all unique concerts. Video could very successfully compensate for the cultural shortage which we are experiencing.

[Ladynin] Excuse me, Oleg Vladimirovich, but are you not making the mistake of confusing reality with wishful thinking? If you will recall the posters of the "pirate" video viewing rooms, it appears they are showing more and more Westerns and other films that bear little resemblance to art. As for the classics, there is still not very much demand for them at video theaters...

[Uralov] Our sociological study, which we conducted in November of last year, indicated that viewers become satiated with that sort of viewing rather quickly; people who have been using a VCR for more than three years now prefer to watch classics, both foreign and Soviet. And it should be noted that up until now each new generation of moviegoers has been denied the opportunity to see all the best that has been created by our cinematographers. Movie theaters virtually never show these films. Television cannot show everything and, most importantly, it cannot cater to people's individual wishes. Television is aimed more at mass interests, while videos are aimed at **individual** interests. There is also one other very encouraging phenomenon: many VCR owners are interested in educational programs. They are studying foreign languages, learning many new things, finding out about things. In my opinion, in contrast to cinematography video should have more of an educational emphasis...

[Ladynin] Yes, video can be of invaluable use for schools. Not only can physics or chemistry lessons, for instance, be made more graphic through the use of video visual aids, a VCR with a selection of educational programs could also solve the problem of home study, for example for sick children. And is that all? Think about villages far from schools, or tenant farmsteads...

[Uralov] Unfortunately, at this time all I can say is that lessons like that will be a reality in the near future. But

indeed, could not video lessons by innovators and progressive teachers raise substantially the level of education even in the most remote parts of our country? The problem lies with video systems, which are still in short supply, plus the fact that the price of videocassettes could be more affordable. You will agree that at the present price of a videocassette (120 rubles) few people can afford to have their own video library.

[Ladynin] But for now all that is just a dream... What about today?

[Uralov] Well, for example, at our videotheques you can rent at quite reasonable prices both classic films from around the world and our original movies, made especially for video. Our collection of foreign masterpieces is also growing constantly.

Now a word about Videofilm productions. Today our system includes seven independent studios. So we are filming both fictional films (for example "Pyat uglov" [Five Corners], which was directed by Valeriy Bunin) and documentary films (such as "Versiya" [The Version], "Stalin s nami?" [Is Stalin With Us?] and others) and educational films (even, for instance, makeup tips) and the most interesting theatrical premieres (for example "Dorogaya Yelena Sergeyevna" [Dear Yelena Sergeyevna], which was staged by the Moscow Studio Theater on Spartakovskaya Square).

Generally speaking our programs are in demand both among Soviet movie lovers and abroad. In fact, why not watch at home, unhurriedly, going back to various scenes, a new work by a unique and complex director like Aleksandr Sokurov? His latest picture "Spasi i sokhrani" [Save and Protect] belongs to us.

Incidentally, this year for the first time we went to the Cannes Film Festival and entered the movie market for television and video movies. And 40 of our films were successful there, and many of them were purchased... The point is that in the West video movies, i.e. pictures filmed directly on videotape, are also a relatively new art form. We have something to teach one another.

We should not forget the tremendous capabilities of our own culture. It is a good basis for the development of video. For example, we have contracted with our Japanese and British colleagues to make 10 films of ballets at the Bolshoi Theater. A solid partner like the Bolshoi Theater immediately aroused keen interest. And a joint production will guarantee us access to international film markets. Incidentally, for the first time in its history the Bolshoi Theater will receive hard currency royalties for these films. That is very important for the theater: foreign construction companies only work for hard currency. And the Bolshoi Theater building needs repairs and restoration.

Our commercial principle is that we are not striving to earn money just by ourselves. We assume that it is better to do so together with partners.



### Clarification of Permitted Standards Sought

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23 Jun 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Belonosov, secretary of Sakhalin CPSU Obkom: "Would Like To Get Out of the Jungle"]

The hullabaloo about videocassettes has spread throughout the whole country. It did not even stop at the Tatar Strait, which separates our country's only island oblast from the mainland: today there are already approximately 3,000 VCR's in the homes of people on Sakhalin and in the Kuril Islands, and dozens of video viewing rooms have been opened. It would seem that one could only be delighted by the wide dissemination of such a convenient and technically advanced channel of information, education and cultural leisure. We are delighted, but unfortunately our joy is often tempered by other emotions. Here is why: even experts are not sufficiently clear on how to deal with the various situations connected with mass video showings, repertoire policy and financial matters.

We are hearing the voice of the public demanding regulation of the video business and erection of barriers against movies which openly promote the cult of cruelty and violence. Most of these complaints are directed at ideological workers. But what can they do, if legislators themselves cannot seem to figure out how to deal with this situation?

I will attempt to back up that thought with facts. Thus, on 25 February 1986 USSR Goskino published its Resolution #63, which stated that "...all video players and recorders are to be registered, regardless of the department or agency to which they belong." This would seem to be an extremely clear situation. But not completely clear, because the subsequent Law on Cooperatives totally ignored Goskino's monopoly on the exhibition of videos. As a result, while discussion about what to do about the videotheques continued local authorities issued permits (all strictly legal!) granting anyone the right to get rich.

In December of last year a resolution was adopted banning certain types of cooperative activity, including the filming and commercial distribution of videotapes; this put video businessmen into a state of shock. It seemed that the situation was being clarified and Goskino's monopoly was finally being restored.

Yet that was not the case. On 13 February of this year a letter was issued concerning registration of videotheques and commercial showing of videotapes; it was signed by N. Silkova, USSR deputy minister of culture, V. Makeyev, AUCCTU secretary, and S. Rogozhkin, All-Union Komsomol Central Committee secretary. This document establishes **its own procedure** for the registration of video equipment and the showing of videotapes. Essentially video businessmen are being advised: hang out a different sign and continue as before, your profits unaffected.

It is interesting to note that this situation had a very unexpected continuation: on 11 April 1989 a memorandum from the RSFSR Ministry of Culture was sent out bearing the signature of A. Protsenko, first deputy minister. This document was an attempt to disavow the recommendations issued by higher-level organs. I think that a quote from it would be appropriate at this point: "By continuing their commercial activities under another name, what are in essence cooperative commercial organizations (videotheques—V. B.) are doing great harm to the upbringing of children and young people..."

"This practice, which is in our opinion harmful and confusing, was reinforced by a memorandum sent out in February of this year by secretaries of the AUCCTU and All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, as well as the USSR deputy minister of culture... USSR Goskino, which has a legally established monopoly on the production and commercial exhibition of all movies, was not consulted about the letter..."

"This letter cannot serve as a legal document for all territorial organs of Soviet authority, as the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and the AUCCTU are public organizations..."

The irony of the situation lies in the fact that even though the memorandum from the RSFSR Ministry of Culture is perhaps closer to the truth it also "cannot serve as a legal document." As I was preparing these comments I read an article by A. Pokhmelkin, candidate of juridical sciences, entitled "'Criminal' Video Production" in the magazine SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST (1988, No 11). It contained a new twist on this subject: reference was made to criminal prosecution for illegal distribution of videotapes. Here is what the article stated: "...The USSR Procuracy has tallied the initial and, quite frankly, rather discouraging results of this struggle. As a result of a review of criminal cases heard by courts in the Ukraine, Kirghizia, Lithuania and a number of oblasts and krais in the Russian Federation it was determined that almost 60 percent of those penalized were convicted without sufficient justification. Without exception all the cases of unjustified conviction were due to the fact that the movies being distributed were not pornographic and did not promote the cult of violence and cruelty. The absence of clear-cut criteria for evaluation led to errors in studies conducted by experts and eventually to the imposition of unjust sentences." We seem to have arrived at a dead end. If highly skilled jurists have difficulty determining whether a movie is harmful or not, then what are we at the local level supposed to do? Who will guide us out of this memorandum jungle?

In this connection I would like to appeal to V. G. Zakharova, USSR minister of culture, B. V. Kravtsov, USSR minister of justice, and A. Ya. Sukharev, USSR Procurator General: when, esteemed comrades, will we see a clear-cut legislative act regarding the production and distribution of films on video? A document which would facilitate real development of video in our country

while preserving public organizations' independence in this regard and also providing local soviets with real regulatory and monitoring mechanisms? The main purpose of such a document would be to encourage a situation in which socialist ideological influence on viewers would outstrip the growth in the number of VCR's, and not the other way around.

### Changes in Media, Religion, State Relationship Debated

#### 'Pro-Religion' Media Bias Blasted

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No 4, Apr 89 pp 9-11

[Article by Aleksey Bykovskiy: "An Abnormal Symbiosis"]

[Text] A. Bykovskiy, an instructor at the University of Marxism-Leninism of the Voronezh CPSU Obkom, sent ZHURNALIST an article which criticizes the reports by our press on questions of religion and atheism. We recommend to readers this article and the commentary written at the editorial staff's request by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences L. Mitrokhin.

Lenin's work "Socialism and Religion," which was the basis for the "Decree on Separation of Church and State and of School and Church" and Soviet legislation on religious cults, states: "We require that religion be a private matter with respect to the state, but we cannot at all consider religion a private matter with respect to our own party. The state should not care about religion, and religious societies should not be associated with state power." But what do we see today in actuality? Religion and all the ideological activities of religious organizations still remain antiscience, idealistic, and contrary to Marxist-Leninist ideology. But in some organs of our state, this axiom has been forgotten. An erosion of socialist, and in particular atheist, ideological content is taking place. Some abnormal symbiosis is being created between religious organizations and certain organs of the press, radio, and television.

Confirmation of this is the fact that religious persons have taken rather strong stands in the mass media and freely propagandize religion. They do not miss a chance to spoon out their ointment on our socialist society, rather openly and persistently seeking to restore the pre-revolution status of the church under conditions of a Soviet state.

I will turn to facts to back up my statement.

In the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (No 23, 1988), Metropolitan Vladimir, answering a correspondent's question about how legislation on cults should be improved, says: "First of all, new legislation should conform to Lenin's decree on the church... The choice by any citizen of religion, atheism, or an indifferent attitude toward them must be made on a purely voluntary basis." But you see, this is exactly how we do it! The provisions

of "Lenin's Decree on the Church" have been developed in the legislation on cults; in particular, the paragraph about the church not having the rights of a juridical person has become invalid. No coercion over a person's conscience or infringement on a personality is permitted; on the contrary, this is punished under Article 228 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. But such infringements do take place on the part of some clergymen and sectarians. Metropolitan Vladimir further says: "Legislation should prevent artificial division of citizens into believers and nonbelievers." But where does he see such a division? Apparently, in the fact that not all of the population goes to church? That is freedom of conscience in action. It is not hard to understand what Vladimir wants. I only doubt whether certain journalists and press organs understand this.

The statements of V. Sorokin, rector of the Leningrad Spiritual Academy and professor of theology, in an interview with a correspondent of MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA (30 March 1988) are of the same nature. Theologian Sorokin shamelessly distorts the Soviet legislation on religious cults, stating that this legislation prohibits charitable activities of the church. The legislation does contain this provision: "Religious associations are prohibited from...providing material support to their members." Apparently, this prohibition does come down to charitable activities. But, you see, religious organizations voluntarily transfer their free money to various social funds. Is this not charity? It is something else to give believers a loan to purchase cows, houses, to help set up a household, or for treatment, which some religious communities try to do and which is prohibited by law. These functions are accomplished by the state, trade unions, kolkhozes, and enterprises. If the church makes monetary handouts, this will bring new types of machinations in the communities and will contribute to the development of begging and a parasitic way of life, poverty, and vagrancy, which are already too prevalent in religious communities.

But V. Sorokin places special emphasis on transferring to the guardianship of the church homes for the aged and invalids, hospitals, and so forth. It is obvious that he clearly dreams of restoring the church's pre-revolution status in the USSR with its asylums, madmen, hysterical women, and beggars, to whom the church gave handouts and created for itself a halo of mercy and thereby strengthened its positions in the society.

The new weekly SEMYA publishes "Cheti Minei" without scientific comments, and thereby forces them on the Soviet reader as the source of our morality. But now every school child knows that it is not religion that gave people the rules that set universal moral standards. They were developed by the popular masses in the course of historical development. And religion borrowed moral standards from the people, giving them a mystical coloration. The articles "The Life of Princess Olga" and "The Life of Prince Vladimir," published in SEMYA, are given unequivocally as an example to follow. But

why follow these examples: cruelty, polygamy, mass murders, and then you will be forgiven and canonized if you accept Christianity?

The All-Union Radio also has not refrained from ideological distortions. Thus, in August, the program "Moldavian Literature" was broadcast. On the program, the short story "Samarityanka" by I. Drutse was read, in which the author and a priest grieved over the closing of 1,500 churches and certain monasteries in Moldavia, regretted the decline in the religiousness of the people, and linked it to the increase in drunkenness, the birth of mentally retarded children, and the emergence of special nurseries for them.

Central Television commits even greater distortions.

Just take the broadcast "Symbols of Eternal Love: Cathedrals" (January 1988). One expected and very much wanted to learn from this broadcast the history of the emergence of the Moscow cathedrals, their architectural peculiarities. But it was not so much about cathedrals as it was about their religious symbols and the religious content of the icons located in them. For example: "Here is depicted Mikhail Arkhistratig—the patron of fighting men, fighter of evil, protector of truth on earth, deliverer from trouble, eradicator of evil on earth, the angel-protector of Rus, he waits for all who suffer and year for purification." Well, how does this all differ from medieval obscurantism? And why present it on TV?

On 2 March of last year, a dialog of alleged scientists on the topic of "Philosophical Discussions" was broadcast. Among them was a theologian in his frock and with a cross on his chest; he spoke in a highly sensitive and emotional manner, but from antiscientific, demagogic positions. And apparently not by chance, at the end they came to the unintelligible conclusion that "in today's complex international situation, a unified, integral world outlook will save the world." What is this—a mixture of communism with religion? You see, K. Marx wrote that the salvation of humanity is in the abolition of private property. Or was he wrong?

On 26 March, the program "Religion and Politics" reported on the completion of restoration of the cathedral at the Danilov Monastery, timed to coincide with the thousandth anniversary of the christening of Rus. Here they showed a divine service dedicated to this event, the church choir sings impressively, and an iconostasis and the entire service are displayed on the screens for a long time. The same was repeated that day on the program "Before and After Midnight," with the addition of showing the divine service performed by the patriarch. But, you see, this entire action by television is a violation of the Leninist principles of the attitude toward religion and the church, and ignores Article 52 of the USSR Constitution in relation to the separation of church and state. The head of the program, breathless with ecstasy, expounded: "The Novodevichiy Monastery, Troitskiy Cathedral, Preobrazhenskiy Monastery, and others envelop the very heart of Moscow with a

bright stone necklace of grandeur, beauty, and wisdom, in which the Danilov Monastery is the most precious pearl in it."

You constantly hear mention over television about who was baptized or married where: "The church in Moscow where A.S. Pushkin was married is being restored," or "V.I. Vernadskiy was born in Leningrad and baptized in Isaakiyevskiy Cathedral." Why have these reports become mandatory; are they really so important to our history or to the biography of these prominent people? Hardly. More likely, this is either a reflection of the pro-church sentiments of the authors, or considerations of the moment, or simply a longing to show their knowledgeability.

But on the program "View," the priest Mark has become already a constant partner and ideological comrade in arms of the head of the show, Mukusev, on social and moral problems. Obviously, our glorious Komsomol, in the person of Mukusev, does not want to talk about these problems with scientists—philosophers, atheists, psychologists. For some reason, the Komsomol member (and, perhaps, even Communist) Mukusev servilely addresses him as "Father Mark." It is as if all this is taking place not in a Soviet television studio but in the church where Mukusev is either a cleric or a parishioner.

The program "View" (5 May 88) showed the baptism process in a Baltic community with religious chants and prayers. Both this demonstration and the reporters' interview of people newly baptized evoke bewilderment. Question: "Has something changed in you since this moment?" The young lad answers: "Yes, I have taken Christ into my heart." Question: "Why were you baptized?" Another lad answers: "So I can always be with God." Then Mukusev began asking "Father Mark" questions which simply challenged and encouraged the priest to freely propagandize his religious views. At the same time, "Father Mark" justified the need for such TV programs: "The subject of religion is steadily bursting into our lives, on the television screens. And how can it be otherwise, you see, it (religious life) exists, Baptists exist, and there is no need to close our eyes to this... You see, they discriminated against Baptists, there were deprivations of parental rights to Baptist faith, they forcibly took children out of houses of prayer..." and so forth in this vein. But, first of all, Father Mark is not accurate: parental rights were deprived not for their faith but for violating the law. Secondly, religious life was and is, religious activities are carried out in families and in prayer rooms, but on what grounds in defiance of the USSR Constitution and for what purpose is it drawn to the television screens? Thirdly, what goals is Mukusev pursuing: communist education of young people or religious instruction? For whom and why is this empty demagoguery of Mukusev with "Father Mark" necessary and useful? In any case, not the Soviet young people.

All these and similar performances are distinguished by one particular feature: their authors and organizers do not differentiate the political and ideological aspects.

They simply do not understand that, today, there are two aspects in every religion: political and ideological. In the political aspect in our country, the Russian Orthodox Church, loyal organizations of Islam, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, and others behave loyally, support the policy of the Soviet state, advocate peace and nuclear disarmament, and take patriotic stands. All this serves the interests of our people, is an object of cooperation with the state, and is good citizenship. But in the ideological aspect, in any religion there remains a mysticism, ideological content, an antiscientific nature, and an opposition to communist ideology. And this interferes with the dissemination of scientific knowledge and the formation of materialistic convictions, and impedes the social and political activeness of people. Therefore, there should be no ideological concessions, reconciliation, and indifference toward religion. You see, it is not by chance that, at the reception of Patriarch Pimen and the members of the synod, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that we have different world-outlook positions than the clergy.

All of the above has the nature of flirting with the clergy, with religion, and evokes among students of our university of Marxism-Leninism bewilderment, a confusion of their thoughts and feelings. It is difficult to answer their questions, and there is nowhere to find an explanation for these performances. At the same time, some ideological workers are disoriented by the fact that in 1988 there were only two atheistic articles—in KOMMUNIST issue No 4 (the editorial "Socialism and Religion") and in PRAVDA on 28 January (the lead article "History and Morality"), not counting the magazine NAUKA I RELIGIYA, of course. There we no other articles on atheistic topics. Therefore, it is not by chance that in many VUZes of the city of Voronezh, the course on the fundamentals of scientific atheism has been excluded from the curriculum.

In the new version of the CPSU Program adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress, in the area of ideological and educational work, atheistic education advanced side by side with the formation of a scientific world outlook in all Soviet people, the basis of which is Marxism-Leninism, side by side with labor education, legal, patriotic, and international education, and the struggle against bourgeois ideology and any manifestations of hostile ideology and morality. In light of these tasks, the demands on the mass media, which V.I. Lenin imposed on the magazine POD ZNAMENEM MARKSIZMA, take on special significance. Lenin believed: "...a magazine that wants to be an organ of militant materialism must be a fighting organ, above all, in the sense of steadfastly exposing and pursuing all contemporary 'lackeys of clericalism who have degrees,' regardless of whether they speak as representatives of official science or as freelancers calling themselves the 'democratic left or ideological and socialist' columnists."

This is the direction given by the CPSU Central Committee Resolution "On the Work of Party Organs of Ulyanovsk Oblast To Implement the Resolution 'On

Restructuring the System of Political and Economic Training of Workers'" published in PRAVDA (14 August 1988). There, it specifically states: "...in all levels of public education and mass propaganda, it is necessary to increase attention to atheistic education on a scientific basis, inculcate in young people an immunity to religious mysticism, and develop a materialistic world outlook."

The above-named and similar articles and radio and TV broadcasts of a pro-church nature clearly do not conform to these Leninist party requirements. The question automatically comes up: Who stands to gain from this?

### New Attitudes Defended

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[Article by Lev Mitrokhin: "Religion and Perestroyka"]

[Text] A. Bykovskiy's article is not simply personal opinion. "All of the above has the nature of flirting with the clergy, with religion, and evokes among students of our university of Marxism-Leninism bewilderment, a confusion of their thoughts and feelings. It is difficult to answer their questions, and there is nowhere to find an explanation for these performances."

Well, in his own way, the author is right. The topic of religion today has appeared in a new way. Not so long ago, it was rarely mentioned and, as a rule, for only one purpose—to call for improving atheistic education. Now they are constantly talking about religion, and the authors are increasingly more often clergymen and the believers themselves. The nature of articles has also changed. Before, they were saturated with undisguised ill will, and on the covers of popular atheistic works were drawn spiders, scorpions, and other harmful insects. Today, on the contrary, the church is drawn in splendid tones, and the unmaskings are addressed to "scientific atheists," who are blamed for the lack of spirituality, the decline in morals, and the barbaric destruction of cultural monuments.

The frailty of the atheistic line of reasoning, which just yesterday seemed unassailable, has also suddenly become clear. The "militant atheists" have somehow died down; the topic has been taken up by aggressive journalists, writing without second thoughts not only for inveterate dogmas but also often, alas, for reliable knowledge. As a result, there indeed is observed among the propagandists of atheism a mass (not just in Voronezh) "bewilderment, a confusion of thoughts and feelings." Some feel betrayed, others have begun to wait for further orders, without which they never would have thought of fighting God. "Atheism" has not simply gone out of style, it has almost become a dirty word.

This article is a reaction to all these changes. The author must be given credit: not everyone would dare to promulgate such a hard-line position. In its own way, it is whole in nature. This is a wholeness of a special attitude, a special perception of those radical changes that are

being made in our society. And it is precisely this symptomatic content that merits public attention.

So there is no need to go into detail about the specifics and individual stylistics of the author. It is more important to try to assess the vector, the social trend of such a position. In doing so, naturally, I do not at all lay claim to infallibility or categoricalness of opinions "on behalf of Marxism": the processes involved are too complex and contradictory.

As one can see, the article touches upon two spheres of problems: 1. The Soviet state's attitude toward religion and the state (the legal aspect). 2. The Communist Party's attitude toward religion and the church, and the work of the mass media associated with this attitude (the ideological aspect).

The article cites the desires of the "clergy" regarding improving the legislation on cults: it is necessary that "new legislation conform to Lenin's decree on the church," that the "choice by any citizen of religion, atheism, or an indifferent attitude toward them" be made "on a purely voluntary basis," and that the legislation "prevent artificial division of citizens into believers and nonbelievers." All these desires are sternly assessed as "fabrications," as a desire "to to spoon out their ointment on our socialist society" and to seek "to restore the pre-revolution status of the church under conditions of a Soviet state," since, the author claims, "this is exactly how we do it!"

These arguments seem strange to me. Everyday we learn from history about new facts of violation of the law, about mass terror and starvation, about the arbitrariness of law enforcement bodies, about the imperfection of legal standards, and about the disparity between word and deed. But all this, it turns out, does not apply to the sphere of religion, and anyone who thinks otherwise is slandering noble social sentiments...

We will have to look back at the first years following the October Revolution, inevitably omitting many details, including some quite significant ones. The active counterrevolutionary activities of church organizations inevitably also evoked extreme retaliatory measures: the closing of churches and monasteries, the dispersal of prayer meetings, repressions toward the clergy and believers who were (or were suspected of being) in collusion with anti-Soviet forces. The hatred toward "priests" that accumulated over centuries resulted in unbridled, destructive actions and persecution of believers for their feelings. The lack of readiness of local party and soviet workers, inclined to resolve everything by "forceful" methods, also had an effect—despite warnings of the party and the provisions of Lenin's Decree on Separation of Church and State. In other words, the attitude toward the church and religion appeared as a critical political problem, going far beyond a world-outlook confrontation.

By the end of the 1920's, however, all the main religious organizations had declared their loyalty to Soviet power.

All the prerequisites were being created to eliminate previous mistakes and excesses. As we know, this did not happen: the process of firmly establishing the gloomy autocracy of Stalin began.

Have we gone too far back into history? I think not. "The provisions of 'Lenin's Decree on the Church,'" the article states, "have been developed in the legislation on cults; in particular, the paragraph about the church not having the rights of a juridical person has become invalid." I will talk a little later about the "juridical person," but for now let us note a significant fact. Interrelations of church and state up to now have been governed by the resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR "On Religious Associations," adopted on 8 April 1929. It is this resolution that states the provisions that "religious societies and groups of believers do not enjoy the right of a juridical person" (Article 3), the conditions of restoration and the right to refuse it, the ban on giving "material support to its members," the prohibition on organized religious instruction for children, and so forth. True, certain changes were later made to the resolution, but its essence has been fully preserved.

The resolution is at least ambiguous in nature. Outwardly, it is phrased in the direction of the 1918 Decree, but its specific standards directly or indirectly govern every step of the church and do not contain guarantees for observing even those rights which it does declare. Subsequent events showed that the clergy and believers, perhaps, most often fell victim to Stalin's arbitrary rule.

True, they may object: even in the 1930's the party repeatedly cautioned against violent actions with respect to the church. Indeed, there was no shortage of words. Thus, the resolution of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee "On Struggling with Distortions of the Party Line in the Kolkhoz Movement" condemned "totally intolerable distortions of the party line in the area of combating religious prejudices... We have in mind the *administrative* closure of churches without the consent of the vast majority of the village, usually leading to an increase in religious prejudices."

Just when was this engaging appeal to take into account the "vast majority of the village" proclaimed? Hard to believe, but it was on 14 March 1930! Yes, during "that very time." And in addition to the caution against "letting success go to one's head" and the hypocritical "the son is not responsible for the father," it became another example of the cynical demagoguery of that time. Difference between the high-sounding declarations and the "practical" orders, official laws and instruction "for official use," in short, between word and deed, became increasingly sinister in nature, and it is not by chance that the so-called "blank spots" in history ooze with the color of blood. And what "separation" of the church can there be if the census sheet for 1937 contained a direct question about attitude toward religion! (If you recall, this column was eliminated at the direct insistence of

V.I. Lenin during the 1920 census.) It was the clergy and the believers who were cited as favorite examples for justifying the famous thesis on aggravation of class struggle.

When the war began, Stalin broke up the Union of Militant Atheists with its 3 million members and in 1942 restored the patriarchate. But soon thereafter, the "forceful" methods with respect to the church again prevailed. They were not affected by the capricious Khrushchev "thaw", and after the 22nd Party Congress (1960), which adopted the program on building communism in 20 years, they prevailed on a large scale: communism does not call for religion. The problem was resolved by the customary administrative-bureaucratic means, namely: the illegal closing of churches. No churches—no religion! In several years their number decreased by almost 10,000. During the so-called years of stagnation, a similar style was preserved. The registration of new communities, which was given the nature of a permit, was made increasingly difficult. And local authorities resisted registration in every possible way, since they believed it indicated blunders in educational work.

At times, administrative-bureaucratic methods are associated with the figure of a narrow-minded official shuffling papers. How naive! Red tape is a precise social philosophy: people are an appendage of administrative structures. They themselves are obtuse, restricted, and only the boss knows what they must do, what should make them happy, and when to applaud to a stupor.

This notion is especially vivid with respect to religion. We build a socialist society and form a "new man" with a scientific world outlook. The believers are an annoying cost of history, a social rudiment subject to planned elimination. Religious ideas, feelings, hopes were an echo from the "past" and should not be taken seriously. The main thing was that they not interfere with the peaceful life of those who report and sound the social bugles. It is hard for me to get rid of the thought that this approach is also present in A. Bykovskiy's article. It is otherwise difficult to explain, for example, the statement that "no coercion over a person's conscience or infringement on a personality is permitted; on the contrary, this is punished under Article 228 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR."

To whom is this addressed? To the millions of believers who have seen their churches closed and destroyed, to the Pentacostals, to the Adventist-Reformists, to the Jehovah's Witnesses, who in accordance with the 1961 instructions were automatically refused registration and subjected to persecutions? To the believers who fell victim to the arbitrariness of the courts and directors of enterprises and educational institutions (quite a few such cases have been reported in our press), to the religious societies that even today are unsuccessful in seeking registration and granting of prayer facilities? But maybe (which would be worst of all) this statement is intended to eliminate the "confusion of feelings and thoughts" in

propagandists so they can bring embellished views to a mass audience, and then be surprised over why the audience loses interest in such trustworthy views?

I will not pick at inaccuracies: Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR dated 27 October 1960 defines punishment for infringement upon a personality and the rights of citizens under the guise of performing religious rites. Obviously, he has in mind Article 142—"Violation of the Law on Separation of Church and State and of School and Church." It indeed provides for harsh punishment and is directed against illegal actions both by religious figures and by officials. In particular, it considers it a violation to "refuse to hire or admit citizens in an educational institution, fire them from a job or dismiss them from an educational institution, deprive citizens of benefits and privileges prescribed by law, as well as other significant restrictions of citizens' rights depending on their attitude toward religion." There is also Article 143—"Hindering the Performance of Religious Rites."

Since this code was adopted, quite a number of religious activists have been convicted under Article 142. This article was unable, however, to prevent crimes by officials. Is it not because not a single case of severe punishment of them has been recorded in the past quarter of a century?

Today, church leaders are stubbornly seeking the right to philanthropic activities. This is primarily caused by the needs of life within the church. Thus, clergymen receive no pension from either the state or from trade unions, and the church is refused this right. A religious association also does not have the right to provide material assistance to particularly needy believers: invalids, the aged, people who are alone, and so forth. This is a vital problem for a quite numerous category of Soviet citizens, and it is unjust to replace it with arguments about church donations to various funds. And the author's assurance that a favorable resolution of this problem would inevitably result in criminal consequences seemed to me to be clearly insulting for the believers.

The situation is similar with the mission of mercy. The church is not at all raising the issue of transferring to it "homes for the aged and invalids, hospitals, and so forth." It is a matter of believers helping to care for the gravely ill, those who are alone, invalids, and the like. I think that there is such a need in the Voronezh hospitals, too. Is it possible that the spirit of mercy and unselfish assistance has become eroded in us to the extent that we are unable to believe in the sincerity of its manifestations in other and are sure to see them as "nostalgia," "a dream of restoration," and a hypocritical desire to seek false "halos of mercy"?

The author also perceives as slander the church's request to be granted the right of a juridical person, since the refusal of this right has "lost validity." Yes, in practice the church usually enjoys this right, but only *de facto*. And until it becomes *de jure*, the church has no reliable

guarantees for it. Generally speaking, it is somehow awkward to mention this now, when the task is being set to create a legal state.

A. Bykovskiy is particularly dissatisfied by the coverage of the status of religion in our country. In his opinion, what we have is "some abnormal symbiosis between religious organizations and certain organs of the press, radio, and television," and "religious persons have taken rather strong stands in the mass media and freely propagandize religion," and with malicious goals.

Such opinions do not occur in a blank space. They one way or another reflect the sharp change in public opinion's image of religion, which was mentioned above. There is not the slightest opportunity even to talk even in a cursory manner about the reasons for the increased sympathy toward the church and believers, and the decline in prestige of straightforward attacks aiming to expose religion (although considering the policy of glasnost, democratization, the struggle against a barbaric attitude toward cultural monuments, and so forth, they are fairly obvious). The new situation, of course, could not help but be reflected in the work of the mass media: religion has become their desired subject. However, coverage of this recent "blank spot" was often done on an amateurish level, and sometimes clearly given tribute as frivolous sensationalism.

This was also demonstrated in connection with the thousandth anniversary of the christening of Rus, when journalists spoke out very often, and were not always steady regarding theological interpretations and the anniversary euphoria. As a result, that truly decisive role which Christianity played as a new world religion in developing domestic culture overshadowed the true historical character of the church, which, being soldered into the structures of czarist power, mercilessly spoke out against any free thought and cruelly persecuted kindred "brothers in Christ" if they searched for God "not in logs but in ribs," not to mention the social protest movements. So, some the level of some materials turned out to be below the works not only of Russian revolutionary democrats, but also of pre-October liberal-bourgeois critics of the church. The festive voice of the TV announcer sticks in my mind: "We celebrate the thousandth anniversary of the christening of Rus as the thousandth anniversary of the Russian culture"—an unfounded statement from the scientific standpoint.

The activities of generations of atheists were drawn in a oversimplified, cartoon form. As was already stated, they were blamed for all sins, including the destruction of churches and persecution of believers. The past, however, was more complicated and more tragic: the majority of atheists were deceived in sincere intentions; they were simply used to justify the Draconian policy that was carried out, and later were loaded into the same prisoner trains as the clergy. I am not talking about the attempts to equate atheism as a legacy of Stalinism. No, atheism is the product of a centuries-old culture, its organic and

integral element. Knowledge and the forces of generations of the noblest minds, including Russian, criticized religion. Disregarding this tradition is as much an intolerable "break" with the past as ignoring, say, religious and philosophical teachings.

In short, in talk about religion and the church, we still have much that is not thoroughly thought through, frivolous, and one-sided. Certainly, this is inevitable: it is a new matter, there are not enough qualified experts, and therefore it is extremely necessary to have constructive criticism, advice, and recommendations. We find a number of them in the article. Indeed, it is more natural to address the priest by his first name and patronymic, and the weekly SEMYA is an inappropriate place for the article (moreover without serious commentary) "Cheti Minei."

However, it seems to me that the fervor of the article lies elsewhere: in denouncing the very fact of a reliable story about our religious situation, especially from the mouths of clergy and believers themselves. The author believes that the "Soviet person" does not need to know the feelings and sufferings of the believers, since for a socialist society they represent not only a foreign but a harmful element. Such an approach, it seems to me, is the result of combining the dogmatism of recent decades and the illusions of critics of religion before Marx.

For example, the article states that "Cheti Minei" cannot be "forced on the Soviet reader as the source of our morality," and I can agree with this. But then his line of reasoning evokes surprise. "...it is not religion that gave people the rules that set universal moral standards. They were developed by the popular masses in the course of historical development. And religion borrowed moral standards from the people, giving them a mystical coloration."

But who, one may ask, developed religion if not the popular masses themselves? Otherwise one will have to conclude that it came either from a revelation from above, or from a conspiracy of "tyrants and priests" pursuing their selfish goals. It was precisely the latter explanation that prevailed before Marx.

The impression is such that a trace of it also creeps into the assessments A. Bykovskiy gives the work of the mass media.

The dominant and recurring theme is the same: Our citizens to not need religion, belief in God occurs primarily at the urging of preachers of religion, and therefore we must "protect" the audience in every way possible from expressions of such views, since this means propagandizing antiscientific, harmful ideas.

This precepts often leads to quite strange arguments. An example of this is the assessment of "Philosophical Discussions." Why does he talk about "alleged scientists"? The discussions are led by prominent representatives of our culture. The author is particularly outraged by the participation of a "theologian in his frock and



with a cross": "Apparently not by chance, at the end they came to the unintelligible conclusion that 'in today's complex international situation, a unified, integral world outlook will save the world.' What is this—a mixture of communism with religion? You see, K. Marx wrote that the salvation of humanity is in the abolition of private property. Or was he wrong?" I have to write this rhetoric off to the polemics of ardor: otherwise I would have to reproach the author for an obvious lack of understanding of the importance of universal values, the combining of efforts of all people to ensure the survival of mankind, in short, the specific nature of the spiritual situation in the uneasy nuclear age.

The line of reasoning about the churches in which A.S. Pushkin was married and V.I. Vernadskiy was baptized is comical. In the author's opinion, such information is hardly mandatory and important "to our history or to the biography of these prominent people." More likely, this is "either a reflection of the pro-church sentiments of the authors, or considerations of the moment, or simply a longing to show their knowledgeability."

Of course, I can concede that some people may not be interested in where Pushkin was married, others may not care where he was born, and still others may be indifferent about his early poetry or rough drafts.

However, it does no good to turn subjective tastes into rules for giving everyone access to culture. Then you invite rigid instructions on this account, and perhaps a special department for developing them. And in it they ponder: Can it reflect undesirably on the consciousness of Soviet people the fact that Gogol wrote "Selected Pieces from Correspondence with Friends," that Lev Tolstoy advocated evangelical morality, that Martin L. King served as a Baptist preacher, that P. Florenskiy was a prominent thinker, and that they held a funeral service for Anna Akhmatova in a church? This information is only "for official use," for special keeping. As far as the "Soviet people" and "Soviet young people" are concerned, they supposedly do not need such information. Need he be reminded that we have cultivated precisely such an approach for decades?

We have become accustomed to saying over and over again that our religion is a "remnant of the past," "blemishes made by capitalism," that belief in God has no social roots, and so forth. We repeated this because we believed that it cannot be otherwise under socialism. However, let us consider the words of Marx: "...Religion will disappear as socialism develops." But, what if the process of development was replaced by a period of stagnation, what if the principles of party and state activities were seriously deformed? There should be no illusions: religious ideas emerge and are reproduced because there are people who sense a need for them. These ideas are an "internal" product of our society, a "living" component of the spiritual life of many Soviet citizens. And as long as things are this way, the church will exist, satisfying such vital needs.

How many believers are there in our country? There may be several tens of millions, not counting people who sympathize with them. If I understood correctly, the author is inclined to refuse them the right to state their convictions and feelings publicly so as not to spoil the poster picture. And there is no need to exaggerate: the fact that speeches of the clergy and believers are broadcast over television or in the press is no violation of the Decree.

The article mentions the program "View," which tells about the baptism of Baptists and has an interview by a reporter with newly baptized young people. "For whom and why is this empty demagoguery of Mukusev with 'Father Mark' necessary? In any case, not the Soviet young people?" Well, it is curious to meet a man who can speak on behalf of Soviet young people. But it is unclear: Weren't the people the reporter interviewed "Soviet young people"? If you follow the author's logic, they were not. And their statements, apparently, were nothing more than "empty demagoguery." But the point is, if you ponder it, this is just what is called insulting the feelings of believers.

Fostering a materialistic world outlook incompatible with religious ideas—this is a program and prescribed requirement of the Communist Party. Therefore, a communist should not wait for additional instructions, but should carry out his atheistic duty, which he himself voluntarily assumed when he joined the party.

I repeat, I had no intention of entering into personal polemics with A. Bykovskiy. This is a matter of disagreeing with the certain stereotype of attitude toward religion which remains both steadfast and aggressive. This should be no surprise. For too long we have been convinced that the church is the bearer of antisocialist ideology; we saw the priest as "alien" and the believer as a "second-class" person so that these ideas did not prevail over others. It is impossible in a few years to reject them and to learn to creatively approach the atheistic legacy of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. But sooner or later this will have to be done. As Marx wrote, "the educator must also be educated."

The article concludes with this: "...The above-named and similar articles and radio and TV broadcasts of a pro-church nature clearly do not conform to these Leninist party requirements. The question automatically comes up: Who stands to gain from this?" I have already stated my opinion about this characterization. However, I should add that we are not putting on a trial, but are building a society where man is the supreme value—and not only the atheist; therefore, the criterion of "who stands to gain" is far from the best one. If we are talking about changes in attitude toward believers and about ensuring them an opportunity to express their views with dignity, one can respond in this way: this contributes to uniting the Soviet people, ensuring civil rights, humanizing human relations, and, in the final analysis, the cause of revolutionary transformation of our society. We should again consider Lenin's tenet from that same work "Socialism and Religion": "Unity of this truly revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class to create a paradise on earth is more



important to us than a unity of opinions of proletarians about a paradise in heaven."

A. Bykovskiy's concern is quite understandable: the atheistic orientation of our press has clearly declined.

But we can hardly overcome this by the methods which the author counts on in the article in ZHURNALIST.

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### Georgian Procuracy Reviews Recent Illegal Land Appropriations

18300738 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
20 Jun 89 p 2

[Interview with Georgian Procurator Vakhtang Razmadze by Irina Inoveli: "Land Use: The Law and Its Enforcement"]

[Text] The Georgian SSR Procuracy has detected numerous instances of violations of land legislation by particular organizations and citizens with the connivance of ispolkoms of local Soviets of Peoples Deputies. An analysis of the causes of this phenomenon is the theme of a conversation between ZARYA VOSTOKA's correspondent and Georgian Procurator Vakhtang Razmadze.

[Inoveli] Vakhtang Apollonovich, what prompted the blanket investigation of the enforcement of legislation concerning land use?

[Razmadze] Last year the republic's Procuracy began to receive numerous complaints about gross violations of passport regulations, land use legislation, and individual housing construction in Marneuli Rayon. An investigation conducted in June of last year fully confirmed these facts. So it was decided at that time to conduct similar investigations in other regions of the republic.

[Inoveli] Does it appear that the picture that emerges enables us to trace certain general tendencies in this matter?

[Razmadze] It must be stated, unfortunately, that the tendencies are basically negative in character. Instead of taking timely steps to expose and eradicate widespread illegal land appropriations, rayispolkoms, local MVD organs, and architectural, planning, and development offices have taken the opposite stance: that of cover-up, toleration, and sometimes outright connivance with the unlawful actions. In a number of regions, procuratorial supervision on this matter has been quite unsatisfactory. As a result of all this, over the span of quite a long time, even many decades, numerous unlawful settlements have been established in Kartli, Kakheti, the Abkhazian ASSR, the South Ossetian AO, and certain other parts of the republic.

It is worth noting that in Marneuli Rayon alone, over the past three years, 1538 persons have moved in from Azerbaijan and Armenia; most of them have been registered by the ispolkoms of the village Soviets in clear violation of the law. Frequently, moreover, the village soviets have failed to submit to the passport desks of the MVD organs information concerning the newly registered persons, and the MVD organs, for their part, have failed to monitor this matter.

[Inoveli] Could you name specific officials authorizing such registrations and allocating land or individual housing construction in Marneuli Rayon without legal grounds?

[Razmadze] Through the negligence or irresponsibility of V. Ninua, the former architect of Marneuli Rayon, 11 workers and employees of the Algeti Sovkhoz were issued plans for the construction of dwellings on plots of land they took over on their own. By order of the sovkhoz board, these persons were assigned household land sections; however, taking advantage of the negligence of the village soviet and the farm's board of directors (Z. Imanova, former chairman of the rayispolkom; G. Katamadze, former director of the sovkhoz; Yu. Yusupov, chairman of the village soviet ispolkom), they also misappropriated public land.

The illegal practice of giving out public lands for household plots has become widespread in the rayon. From 1982 through 1985, for example, 24 persons were given a total of 2.28 hectares for household plots on the basis of orders issued by R. Gumbatov, director of the Kzyl-Adzhlo Sovkhoz; subsequently this was protested by the procurator. Through forgery, M. Olkanyan, chairman of the ispolkom of the Akhkerp Village Soviet, illegally registered one Atabegyan, a resident of Yerevan, and permitted him to build a house—against the law—having given authorization for this after the construction was already completed. The rayon procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings in this matter, and a preliminary investigation is underway.

[Inoveli] You mentioned that other regions of the republic have been subjected to similar investigations....

[Razmadze] Serious violations have been found in Gardabani Rayon, where wholesale giveaways of public land and illegal housing construction have been going on for a long time. In Sartichala, Muganlo, Gachiani, and other village soviets, hundreds of families have appropriated land without permission and built dwellings there, with the connivance of local authorities. It should also be noted that many residents of Gardabani Rayon have moved to Kirov Rayon in Tbilisi, where they have illegally set up a whole community and appropriated 19 hectares of land.

Despite the fact that violations of land use legislation in Gardabani Rayon continue to this day, G. Veliyev, chairman of the rayispolkom, has not taken any effective measures to halt them and to punish the guilty, although he himself deserves punishment for this inaction.

[Inoveli] Marneuli and Gardabani rayons are inhabited primarily by Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Is the situation with regard to land use any better in regions where the indigenous population is dominant?

[Razmadze] Unfortunately, no. Over the span of quite a long time, there have been gross violations of regulations governing individual housing construction and the terms of legislation on land use in Kvareli Rayon. Way back in the late 1950s, 1635 persons from the Dagestan ASSR moved to Kvareli for permanent residence; they were allocated 120 hectares of land to build on. Later on, as a result of natural population increase and the splitting off

of new families on separate farms, illegal land appropriations began. Today the settlers have taken over 23 hectares. In late 1987, the Kvareli Rayispolkom (A. Gavashelishvili, chairman), instead of undertaking to enforce legal measures against persons who took over land plots without permission, petitioned the republic's Council of Ministers to legalize the appropriated lands, and this was done in February 1988. This kind of "policy" brought it about that they started to build an illegal road from Dagestan to Kvareli Rayon. This construction was halted only as a result of intervention by the press and the republic's public opinion.

Widespread appropriation of state lands has also taken place in Lagodekhi Rayon, where settlers from Azerbaijan and Dagestan have taken up permanent residence without legal authorization. With the direct connivance of the present and former chairmen of the rayispolkom (M. Zurabashvili and A. Kapanadze), many village soviets in the rayon have been the scene of more and more cases of illegality in matters of land use and individual housing construction. And even though these matters have been discussed regularly over the past nine years at rayispolkom meetings, practically nothing has been done to stop gross violations.

[Inoveli] Would you say that this is one of those cases where words diverge sharply from deeds?

[Razmadze] It would be hard to conclude otherwise. Judge for yourself: When local authorities are eyewitnesses to the systematic takeover of lands, yet they fail to notice it for some reason, and then they call for compliance with the law, one can hardly speak of any unity between word and deed. Consider this eloquent touch: When we decided to provide practical help to the Lagodekhi Rayon Procuracy (O. Kharaishvili) and make a thorough investigation of the state of compliance with legislation concerning land use, at the initiative of the rayon procuracy and at the request of the raykom first secretary, O. Maysuradze, every effort was made to postpone the investigation until later.

[Inoveli] You said that widespread violations of the law have also been detected in Abkhazia and South Ossetia....

[Razmadze] That's right. In Abkhazia there is a widespread type of violation in which land is given to persons not living on the territory of a specific village soviet. For example, Tbilisi resident R. Khutaba was allocated 0.15 hectares of land from the pastures of the kolkhoz in Blaburkhva, Gudauta Rayon. Also allocated household land plots there were V. and Z. Khutaba, who live in Pitsunda and have no connection with the kolkhoz. In exactly the same way, a total of 1.75 hectares on the kolkhoz in Zvandripsh was given to persons who live outside the rayon. By arbitrary decision of G. Agerba, chairman of the kolkhoz in Dzhiirkhva, 19 families have come to the village from various cities and rayons of the republic since 1984 and, without being registered there, have nevertheless engaged in kolkhoz work and settled

there. A total of 63 persons in Gudauta Rayon are in illegal possession of 15.74 hectares of land.

The same kinds of violations have been detected in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, and in Bolnisi, Dmanisi, and a number of other rayons of the republic.

[Inoveli] People are also talking about illegal construction within the Tbilisi city limits....

[Razmadze] It must be acknowledged that such talk is based on serious grounds. Indeed many cases of widespread illegal construction and the takeover of land plots have been exposed in the republic's capital city. I believe it is up to the rayon law enforcement organs, the rayispolkoms of the Soviets of People's Deputies, and, of course, the Main Architectural Planning Administration of the City of Tbilisi, to sound the alarm and actually put a stop to violations of land use regulations. For some reason, however, these offices have failed to notice many illegal actions in this regard. The violations have been going on for dozens of years, yet there has been no reaction. There has been no control over construction in Tbilisi and its suburbs, no monitoring of the correct siting of structures and buildings. In 1987, the Tbilisi Gorispolkom evaluated the work of these services, which were supposed to work out a plan of measures to put a stop to illegal construction. It must also be noted that over the past seven years the Tbilisi Gorispolkom has not once shown any initiative in stepping up efforts against illegal construction and the misappropriation of land plots; nor, in this regard, has it analyzed the work of a single one of the 10 rayispolkoms or evaluated the activities of former ispolkom chairmen and their deputies; many of them continue to hold responsible posts to this day.

[Inoveli] Perhaps the next question will seem a bit delicate, but I think there is no way to avoid it: Why is it that, to judge by the examples you have cited, the land is being misappropriated chiefly by people not of the indigenous population of the republic?

[Razmadze] Let's say that having sensed that certain officials do not have the proper attitude toward matters of land use, citizens who took up permanent residence in Georgia 10, 20, or 30 years ago have hastened to invite their relatives or friends here, many of whom the local authorities are amazingly ready to meet halfway. And persons who in previous years complained about giving the land away and assigning it to Johnny-come-latelies to the republic were frequently accused of political shortsightedness, of failing to appreciate internationalist education, and even of nationalism.

[Inoveli] A final question. Understandably, the purpose of these integrated investigations into correct enforcement of land use regulations is not so much to detect cases of violation as to get rid of them and also to determine the causes of the illegality. What kind of picture is emerging?

[Razmadze] It has been determined that 620 hectares of land have been misappropriated. Thanks to measures that have been taken, 528.12 hectares have been returned to social-sector farms. A study of court practices in cases involving violations of land use legislation gives grounds for concluding that court reports [chastnyye opredeleniya suda] are not very effective; in many cases they are never responded to. In some cases, the people's courts have handed down incorrect and unsubstantiated decisions with regard to matters of this category.

Many shortcomings have also been found in the work of the regional procurators, who have not exercised the necessary supervision over the enforcement of land use laws. All of this was the subject of discussion at a meeting of the board of directors of the Georgian SSR Procuracy, which decided to make radical changes in the state of affairs in the sphere of enforcing legislation governing land use, and which worked out measures and recommendations designed for this specific purpose.

As for the causes of the widespread character of violations of the law in previous years, it must be stated frankly that it resulted directly from the insidious practice in which unlawfulness was elevated to the rank of law. Instead of demanding a strict accounting from the ispolkoms of local soviets for the land giveaway, the previous leadership of the republic's Council of Ministers took a different route: It approved the unauthorized land takeover, thus encouraging new cases of unlawfulness.

Recently we proposed to the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers the necessity of regulating mechanical population growth in a number of regions due to persons coming in from outside the republic. It is also high time that we made a complete inventory of the land in order to establish proper state order in the sphere of land use. The land is the people's property, and we must all be responsible for its safeguarding and for its rational, economical, and—of course—legal utilization.

### **Specialist on Video Piracy, Pornography, Black Market**

18110092 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
6 Apr 89 p 3

[Interview with video culture specialist V. Yu. Borev by MOLOD UKRAYINY correspondents S. Pluzhnikov and A. Trushkin: "What Kind of Video Fare Is Available?"]

[Text] While not yet having entered every home, the video phenomenon has presented us with many problems—of a technical, legal, moral, and creative nature. We have endeavored to gain a grasp of the situation with the assistance of Candidate of Art Studies and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Yu. Borev, a specialist in the field of video culture.

[Borev] According to rough estimates, there are more than 1 million VCRs in the USSR. The Ministry of Electronics Industry has manufactured only 100,000 of this total—the rest were manufactured in other countries. Research scholars estimate that approximately 20 million Soviet citizens would not object to acquiring at least a video cassette player. Our industry's planned production figures, however, are such that it would take 150 years to meet present demand. By the end of the century VCR manufacture is to reach a figure of only 120,000 units annually.

But people want to view video films, and the solution is group viewing. A large number of video cafes, "video halls", and "video salons" have sprung up. But many of these have shut down following the USSR Council of Ministers decree on restricting the activities of video cooperatives. In addition, many zealous local administrative officials have shut down "video studios" operating under the auspices of MZhK [expansion unknown], Komsomol youth centers, and trade union club facilities. And the state production and rental network in this country is very little developed. In my opinion both cooperatives and other organizations should be given back the right of initiative, of course within the framework of the law.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] It is rumored that this Council of Ministers decision is connected with the fact that some cooperative was taken to court by Western video producers for copyright violation. There are rumors about huge fines which the members of the cooperative had to pay to the state in hard currency.

[Borev] No, there were no such hard-currency fines. And the very story of a fine was made up by an official at USSR Goskino and found its way into the newspapers and television. The All-Union Copyright Agency replied as follows to an official inquiry: "At the present time violation of the proprietary rights of the authors of works recorded on video cassettes apparently consists in the fact that they are not paid royalties, that is, there is pecuniary loss. In connection with this the copyright holder can bring suit demanding financial compensation. We do not have any data on the actual occurrence of such suits or how the courts have handled them."

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] So the fact is we are violating international law in this area.

[Borev] Of course, and not only with video cassettes. For this reason we are currently drawing up rules and procedures for payment of royalties to copyright holders for the commercial use of Western and Soviet video tapes. Payment would be paid through VAAP, in the amount of 10 percent of revenues.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] Well, let us hope that the problem of video piracy will disappear. But what about the question of morality?

[Borev] That is a complicated question. Several years ago there were vigorous efforts against so-called "video

vipers." In 1987 alone 250 criminal indictments were brought against the owners of video equipment. The law provided harsh punishment for displaying films "which promote the cult of violence and cruelty"—imprisonment plus confiscation of equipment. But law violations were increasing year by year. Then, at the recommendation of the Prosecutor General of the USSR, an expert commission was formed under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the members of which included sociologists, legal specialists, and specialists in culture and the arts. More than 3000 video cassettes of questionable content have been examined to date—not one has been determined to be illegal. Today 60 criminal cases involving video tapes have been examined on appeal and the convictions set aside. A number of additional cases are currently under appeal. Article 228 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, on the basis of which the charges were brought, fails to stand up under criticism, and for that reason was not included in the new draft Basic Criminal Code.

Just think about it: proceeding from the letter of the law, prohibited films would include war films, historical-revolutionary films, detective films, and even such a classic as, for example, "The Battleship Potemkin." Just consider the execution of the sailors on the ship and the peaceful demonstration in town. Are these not scenes of violence and cruelty?

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] And what about pornography?

[Borev] Depending on what you consider to be pornography.... In this country we do not have a clear notion of the difference between pornography and erotic films. If one considers indecent the showing of a naked female (or male) body, then it would be necessary to ban a great many films, both Soviet and foreign. These would include F. Fellini's "Casanova," as well as "The Dawns Are Quiet Here...." and "Little Vera."

A method was devised quite some time ago in Soviet art criticism and given approval by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Cinema Art and USSR Goskino. The following can be considered attributes of a pornographic film: failure of the film makers to identify themselves; use of pseudonyms by the actors and directors in place of their real names; display of sexual scenes for the sole purpose of showing sex, when no artistic function is served. And additional criteria? Purely arbitrary linkage between individual segments, when the characters function only as sex symbols, and their character and personality are replaced by temperament; predominant use of full view, direct lighting, and full-on-camera angles when showing scenes containing the sex act.

Incidentally, this method is also applied in foreign countries which adhere to the Geneva Convention of 13 October 1923, to which the Soviet Union is also a party. In Great Britain in 1981, 15,000 cassettes were removed from circulation and 31 criminal indictments were brought. In 1985 President Reagan signed into law a bill

calling for criminal penalties against directors and distributors of child pornographic films, with penalties running up to 100,000 dollars in fines and 10 years in prison.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] A method exists, but many people are not acquainted with it. Decisions at the local level are frequently made by boards consisting of local librarians, gynecologists, and urologists.... Nor should we ignore the fact of subjectivity of opinion which as a rule characterizes members of the older generation in regard to judging the "morality" of films. The film "Little Vera" caused quite an uproar!

[Borev] In debatable cases one can turn for assistance to the board of experts attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on Philosophy, Culture and Ideological Trends. Its address is Volkhonka 14, Moscow 129842.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] What about video film supply and demand in our video market?

[Borev] Analysis of the operations of state video rental stores (there are approximately 40 in the USSR) indicates that slightly more than 5 percent of VCR owners use their services. The remainder use the "black market," the extent of which presently amounts to approximately 30,000 viewing hours. Unfortunately the Video Film All-Union Artistic Production Association is unable adequately to handle its job.

Perhaps the youth video information agency recently formed under the auspices of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee will be able to accomplish something substantial. Its people are planning to address problems arising at the juncture of culture and technology. These would include new video offerings for youth, a video rental network, production of video film clips, plus many other things. The Video Culture and Youth Scientific Research Center, attached to the Integral Youth Center, was also recently established in this country. The center develops new forms of leisure-time video, analyzes the "video black market," suggests methodological literature on evaluating video films, on organizing clubs, and a bibliography of video offerings published in this country. One can write the center at the following address: 129301, Moscow, ulitsa B. Galushkina, 3, Building 1.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] Can you state in greater detail what new video cassettes are currently being produced? How will it be possible to view them?

[Borev] Soon video buffs will be able to view a unique item entitled Feyerverk-1 [Fireworks 1], featuring A. Pugacheva, as well as the film "Plastic Movements of Modern Dance," on the method of famed Dutch dancer B. Felixdal. Not only musical entertainment programs but documentaries as well will be available on video cassettes.

The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee video agency has prepared video cassettes of plays presented

by the Sovremennik [Contemporary] Theater: "Stars in the Morning Sky"; "Kolombina's Apartment"; as well as musical programs featuring the groups Master, Attraktion, DDT and Alyans.

These programs are intended for viewing at youth centers. Formal arrangements can be made with the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Youth Video Agency by writing to the following address: 123376, Moscow, ulitsa Druzhinnikovskaya, 15, MVA [Youth Video Agency].

### Status of Soviet Jewish Culture Debated

18001341 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in  
Russian Second Edition 24 Jun 89 p 3

[Letters by Professor V.I. Rabinovich, doctor of philosophical sciences, and L. Rumyantsev, journalist: "Source of Sorrow: Two Letters Come to Light"]

[Text]

#### Perhaps, I Misheard

Esteemed Comrades!

Perhaps I misheard, but this morning the Voice of America reported through commentator Lana Dale that a branch of B'nai B'rith has been opened in Moscow "to struggle against anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and to develop cultural ties."

Cultural ties—that is fine. But why do we need foreign assistance in the struggle against anti-Semitism? Moreover, since its birth B'nai B'rith has used this camouflage to carry out only one struggle—against the enemies of Zionism.

It is well known that B'nai B'rith is one of the most powerful Zionist organizations in the USA; with the help of the "Jewish lobby" it blocks the government of that country when the latter attempts to move even one inch away from the Zionist interests of Israel. This organization is closely linked to the "Jewish Section" in the CIA, which provides for the participation of Mossad, the Israeli spy service, in American intelligence operations.

If the Voice of America information is not a provocation, then I would like to know how a branch of B'nai B'rith in Moscow will carry out its program. How compatible is cooperation with an organization of this kind with our world view?

With respect,

L. Rumyantsev, journalist, Sverdlovsk.

Having lived two-thirds of a century and having passed through the selection of Stanlinism (because of my youth I only fell into the category of "son of an enemy of the people," the fire of war (I was a volunteer and became an invalid of the Patriotic War), as well as the swamp of stagnation (my finished doctoral dissertation languished in the philosophy department of Moscow State University for 12 years), I learned not to believe the slogans

which were pumped out everywhere, no matter how modern and radical they seemed at first glance. This also applies to the great multitude of concepts and views about the past, present and future of the culture of Soviet Jews—concepts and views which are extremely elegant in form and bold in spirit and which have been bandied about on the pages of official and unofficial publications. Today I would like to dispute some of them.

For example, in VESK (VESTNIK YEVEREYSKOY SOVETSKOY KULTURY [Bulletin of Soviet Jewish Culture]), which is published by the Association of Active Participants and Friends of Soviet Jewish Culture and which has a circulation of 20,000, an author of a very substantial article assures us that "today culture is gathered under national banners." I will not begin to find fault with the extremely serious image of "banners." I will only note that by itself the slogan of a purely national culture is not an idea of "today"; it is of an extremely venerable age, and it is fraught not only with partial victories but also with great problems. In my opinion the words of another author are more reasonable. He states: "Our VESTNIK (Bulletin) will fight with perseverance and consistency for the preservation and expansion of the spiritual riches accumulated by man," in other words, for a combination of the national and the international in culture. But this same editorial, which in general is very successful, repeats the common stereotype about the language "loss" of Soviet Jews and emphasizes that the language should be "returned" to the people, who have been virtually deprived of the language... "It is true, the first author concedes, that "one can inform one's reader of 'something' in another language...."

Let us think for a moment: have hundreds and thousands of members of our intelligentsia really been "almost deprived of the language?" Have not Isaak Babel, Osip Mandelstam, Boris Pasternak, Olga Berggolts, Mayya Plisetskaya, Mark Prudkin, Arkadiy Raykin, Iosif Kobzov and hundreds of other cultural masters whom I am not in a position to enumerate here been able to inform us of "something" precisely because they they were "virtually deprived of the language?" Is it not time, respected VESK editorial board, to recognize the real facts: in the sphere of labor and daily life the native language for a majority of Soviet Jews is Russian, just as it is English for American Jews, French for French Jews and Spanish for Argentine Jews, etc. This, of course, in no way excludes the use of Yiddish among an insignificant number of Soviet Jews, or the knowledge by certain citizens of Hebrew, a language which today is freely studied in classes given by Hebrew cultural societies for those wishing to enroll. One should not mourn here the "losses" and the use of "another language"; rather one should accept and appreciate the reality of the multilingualism of that ethnic group which has survived the diaspora; one should also take into account the knowledge of various languages possessed by Soviet Jews living in our national republics, and the voluntary acceptance of Russian—the language of a great culture—as their native language by a majority of those people.

To continue. Here is a booklet devoted to the opening of the Education and Cultural Center imeni Solomon Mikhoels, which took place in Moscow on 12 February 1989. I understand that it was published in distant Australia, and while it contains (page 7) greetings from the Israeli foreign affairs minister, Moshe Arens, he also had to call for a renewal of the "ties between our fellow Jews and the people of Israel, who await them in our ancient homeland," and the vice-president of the World Jewish Congress, Izzy Liebler, had to proclaim with pathos (p 18): "The great Jewish leader, Theodor Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement..." etc. But how can the Education and Cultural Center imeni S. Mikhoels in Moscow add these appeals to its program? Surely not by mechanically combining the Zionist star with the hammer and sickle on the cover and on each of the 40 pages of the booklet? And, indeed, can these symbols be combined?

And I absolutely cannot refrain from saying just a few words about the program of one other "cultural" organization—the Jewish Cultural Association (EKA). It was published by the "Jewish Information Center in Moscow," which itself demands that "a reference is essential when reprinting." And it is here, in No 29 for 1988 of the *INFORMATSIONNYY BULLETEN PO VOPROSAM REPATRIATSII I YEVREYSKOY KULTURY* (Information Bulletin on Questions of Repatriation and Jewish Culture), that there is a platform editorial, the essence of which is as follows:

"We proceed from the premise that the main task of USSR Jews today is to survive as a component of the Jewish people. Toward this end we see the following main directions: emigration, repatriation to Israel, the development of cultural and religious institutions... Thus the problems come down to three points: freedom of emigration, freedom for the development of national life within the USSR (so-called culture) and freedom to oppose anti-Semitism."

What can be said about such a "platform?"

This resembles the "final solution of the Jewish question" in the USSR by luring more tens of thousands of Soviet Jews supposedly to Israel, but in fact, to distant places overseas. And inasmuch as hundreds and thousands of Soviet Jews, as the authors themselves acknowledge, are not thinking about "repatriation" from their native parts, it is their opinion that in order to "give a national cast" to this "great resettlement" of people it is necessary to create a clerical-communal-Zionist, as they put it, "so-called culture." In this the emigration of all Soviet Jews is the cherished goal, while the "so-called culture" is the means by which it is justified and nothing more. A remarkable perspective! Personally I do not like this at all—choosing between repatriation and becoming part of the "so-called culture." For since childhood I have already become part of a great culture. And I cannot fail to see that along with the deportation of Soviet Jews from the USSR by informal leaders from the "Jewish Cultural Association," the plans

includes the complete elimination of the culture of Russian Jews—the elimination of the modern day Soviet Jewish culture as such.

In my opinion these "culture bearers" are ready to "support" Soviet Jewish culture in exactly the same way that a rope supports a hanged person.

No, the pro-Zionist goals and pseudo-cultural means remain for us alien and unattractive. We live in a great country; we are a unit of a great people, who are proceeding down the path of renewal and perestroika. Foam forms on the waves of perestroika, but out of foam one cannot create the sea, just as one cannot build a genuine culture on a pseudo-culture. The successful development of Soviet Jewish culture can take place only on the basis of dialectical mutual enrichment of national and international tasks. We have the right and the opportunity to ensure the healthy development of Soviet Jews in our multi-nationality home.

And on the subject of rights, many people today are talking about the rights of Soviet Jews. As an example I cite one typical statement by R. Spektor, who is active in EKA and who spoke not long ago to students at the Moscow Institute of Petroleum and Gas imeni I.M. Gubkin. After emphasizing that he is quite a Zionist in a certain sense of the word, Spektor goes on to say: "It seems to me that those processes which today are taking place in the territory in which we live give us the opportunity to defend our rights."

I agree that Jews, like USSR citizens of other nationalities, today have every opportunity to defend their rights. But I am also convinced that one cannot defend one's rights while espousing the philosophy of a person who does not live in the country, who does not live in a society of people but in a "territory" instead. For the absolute majority of Soviet Jews this is not a temporary territory of residence, but their native land. Their homeland. Two hundred thousand Soviet Jewish warriors gave their lives for it; they lie in fraternal graves alongside their fellow fighters—Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Armenians, Belorussians...

Today the guarantee for the development of Jewish culture lies in the friendship of all peoples; to strengthen that friendship it is essential to oppose firmly those who preach any form of nationalism and racism, including anti-Semitism and Zionism.

In order to preserve and develop the uniqueness of national historical and cultural traditions it is essential to create associations, societies and centers which have as their goal the development of socialist culture as a culture common to all mankind, which includes and implies mutual enrichment and development, while steadily preserving the national features of literature, music, theater, and everyday culture.

It is necessary to proceed from the real fact that within the multi-voiced culture of Soviet Jews it is their Russian-language culture which dominates, naturally without hindering the development of the linguistic culture of Yiddish and Hebrew.

It should not be forgotten that language is only the material form of the expression of a delicate spiritual culture. And for this reason the intellectual-esthetic value of the creative works of Mikhoels and Meyerhold is probably close to identical for Soviet Jews. As for Kvitko and Marshak, let us say, they are distinguished not by the fact that one wrote in Yiddish and the other in Russian but by the fact that one was a talented person and the other was a genius of Soviet children's literature.

Nor should it be forgotten that conversational and literary language are not the only language of culture and art. The Soviet architect Ginzburg talked in the language of architecture and Eizenshteyn talked in the language of the cinema.

It is time to do away altogether with judgements about Jewish culture, especially or mainly in the context of ideas of the commune and Judaism. Yes, the theologian Moses Maimonides was a great philosopher of the Middle Ages, but the greatest philosophers of the new era, who broke away from the paths of both the commune and religion were Benedict Spinoza and Karl Marx. And are their traditions not the most valuable component of universal culture as well as Soviet Jewish culture?

In our country Jews live and labor alongside working people of all other nationalities. They frequently enter into mixed marriages; they enjoy all the rights of USSR citizens; they are participating actively in the process of renewing our society; they are making a truly enormous contribution to the development of Soviet internationality culture. Any purely nationalistic goals and programs are alien to the overwhelming majority of decent, progressive and educated people. That is not the way we think.

[Signed] *V.I. Rabinovich, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor*